Report on orbital debris by unknown
wj mq wrl in
•1:1:11F M112:1:
lor.nr
L
L{,;_ '?
u55
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19900003319 2020-03-19T23:48:20+00:00Z
REPORT ON ORBITAL DEBRIS
by
INTERAGENCY GROUP (SPACE)
for
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Washington, D.C.
FEBRUARY 1989
LIBRAVY
n7Rtiono3 
AerQaaul3^ o,a oopJCG Admtn^^' R
shington D.C• V.54F
William Djinis, NASA
Dan Jacobs, NASA
Joseph P. Loftus, NASA
Dr. Andrew Potter, NASA
Don Kessler, NASA
Gene Stansbery, NASA
Larry Heacock, NOAA
Norman Bowles, DOT
Dr. Aviva Brecher, DOT
LTC James Ahern, OSD
LCDR Stephen Long, USSPACECOM
MAJ Ralph Brown, AFSPACECOM
CAPT John C. Derby, AFSPACECOM
MAJ Al Chubbs, USAF, Space Division
21-T Ken Hyatt, USAF, Space Division
Arthur O. Morse, Aerospace Corp.
Edna Jenkins, NAVSPASUR
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Report on Orbital Debris was written by the Interagency Group (Space) Working Group on Orbital
Debris. The Working Group was co-chaired by senior officials from NASA and DoD. NASA was represented
by Kenneth S. Pedersen, Associate Administrator for External Relations. DoD was represented by Philip
Kunsberg, Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (from July through September 1988) and by
James H. Binns, Jr., Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (International Security Policy) (from
September through February 1989). The membership of the Working Group included:
Joseph Mahon, NASA
William Djinis, NASA
Dan Jacobs, NASA
John Shephard, NASA
Carol Lane, Department of Transportation
Norman Bowles, Department of Transportation
Carl Rappaport, Department of Transportation
Ron Gless, Department of Transportation
Elaine David, Department of Transportation
Jeffrey Maclure, NOAA
LTC James Ahern, Office of Secretary of Defense
MAJ Willie Shelton, Office of Secretary of
Air Force
MAJ Tom McDowell, SDIO
Michael Michaud, Department of State
Bill Kendall, Department of State
Dean Olmstead, Department of State
Vic Teplitz, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
Bruce Kraselsky, Department of Commerce
Ed Murphy, Department of Treasure
Morris Rosen, Intelligence Community Staff
Robert Pritchard, Intelligence Community Staff
Jack Fellows, Office of Management and Budget
	 Thomas Tycz, FCC
The initial drafting committee for the Working Group included:
•4
WORKING GROUP REPORT ON ORBITAL DEBRIS for IG (SPACE)
	
TABLE OF CONTENTS
	
Page
PART ONE: DIMENSIONS OF THE ORBITAL DEBRIS PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 1: THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
	
INTRODUCTION	 .........................................	 l
I.	 DESCRIPTION OF THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 . . . 1
A. Background	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . . .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 1
B. Debris Distribution	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	 3
C. Orbital Lifetime	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 . . . . .	 .	 . .	 . . .	 . .	 . . .	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	 .	 . .	 .	 . . .	 . .	 . .	 4
D. Debris Effects
	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 4
E. Uncertaint y in the Debris Environment . . . . . . . . . . ... . .. .... . ... . . . . . . . . 5
II.	 SOURCES OF ORBITAL DEBRIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. General	 ................................................... 	 6
B. Fragmentation	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	 7
C. Satellite Deterioration & Solid Propellant Particles 	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
D. Uncertainties .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 . .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 9
CHAPTER 2: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
TRENDS
	 ....................................................11
A. Launch Activity
	 . . . . . .	 . .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 . . .	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	 . . . . . . . . .	 . .	 . . 11
B. Debris Modeling
	 . . . . . . . . .	 .	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
C. Debris Generation Projections
	 . . . . . .. . .. .. ... . ..... .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . . 12
D. Light Pollution	 .	 . . . . . . . . . .
	 . .	 . . .	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	 . . . . .	 . . . . . . .	 . . . . 14
II.	 IMPLICATIONS
	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
PART TWO: CURRENT POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES, OPPORTUNITIES AND
ASSOCIATED RESEARCH NEEDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
CHAPTER 3: EXISTING POLICIES CONCERNING SPACE DEBRIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	
INTRODUCTION	 .........................................17
I. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY . . .. . .. . .. . .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 17
II. LIMITED AGENCY POLICIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
III. FURTHER ONGOING EFFORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CHAPTER 4: MONITORING THE DEBRIS ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
I. CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
II. OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT AND FUTURE RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.	 Evaluate and exploit existing capabilities
	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
(l)	 Studies of measurement capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
(2)	 Trade-off and systems studies
	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
i
(3) Debris measurements	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 24
B.	 Expansion of Existing Capabilities - Radar 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 24
(1) Increase power on existing collateral radars 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .24
(2) Debris Environment Characterization Radar (DECR) .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 24
(3) MIT/Lincoln Lab Small Object Identification 	 . . . . .	 .	 ..	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 24
(4) Reentering Debris Radar (REDRAD)	 . . . . . . . . . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 25
(5) Other Radars (Foreign and Domestic)	 . . . . . . .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 25
(6) Space-based Debris Radars 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 25
C.	 Expansion of Existing Capabilities - Optical Sensors 	 . . . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 26
(1) Ground-based	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .26
(2) Space-based	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .26
D.	 Returned	 Material Analysis	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 27
(1) Returned Spacecraft Surfaces 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .27
(2) Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF)	 . . . . . . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 27
(3) Witness	 Plates	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 27
(4) Cosmic	 Dust	 Facility	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 27
CHAPTER 5: MANAGING THE DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
I. CURRENT DATA MANAGEMENT STATUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
II.	 OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT AND FURTHER RESEARCH . . . . . . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 29
A.	 Data	 Bases	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 29
(1)	 SPADOC4	 .............................................29
(2)	 Smart	 Catalog	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 29
B.	 Data	 Processing	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .29
C.	 Modeling	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 ..	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 ..30
D.	 Validation	 and	 .Analysis	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 30
CHAPTER 6: MINIMIZING DEBRIS GENERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
I.	 CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A. Design Philosophy	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
B. Operational Procedures	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
II.	 OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND FUTURE RESEARCH 	 . . . . . . . . . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 31
A.	 Mitigation	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .32
B.	 Disposal	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .32
(1)	 Mission	 Design	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 32
(2)	 System Configuration and Operations Studies	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 33
C.	 Removal	 ..................................................33
(1)	 Large	 Objects	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 34
(2)	 Small	 Objects	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 ..	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 ..	 .	 .	 .	 ..34
CHAPTER 7: SURVIVING THE DEBRIS ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
I. CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
II. OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT AND FUTURE RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A. Mission Design	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
B. System Protection	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
(1) Hypervelocity impact testing and facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
(2) Modeling impact effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
(3) Materials research and development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
ii
(4) Shielding concepts 	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
(5) Validation and certification	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
C.	 Collision Avoidance	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
PART THREE: INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, LEGAL ISSUES AND COMMERCIAL
REGULATION..... . . . . . . . . 39.... . ....
CHAPTER 8: INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
I. APPROACHES TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
	 . . . . . . 39
II. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
III. INSTRUCTIONS TO DELEGATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
CHAPTER 9:	 LEGAL ISSUES
	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.	 THE MEANING OF "SPACE DEBRIS"
	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
II. APPLICABLE DOMESTIC LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
III. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
CHAPTER 10: COMMERCIAL REGULATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
INTRODUCTION
	 .........................................47
I.	 REGULATORY OVERVIEW	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 ...	 ................. .	 .	 . 47
II.	 DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION APPROACH
	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 48
A.	 Licensing and
	
Enforcement
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 48
B.	 Regulatory and Safety Research and Standards Devel 	 . .	 . .	 . . .	 . .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 49
C.	 Financial Responsibility and Insu rance Requirements
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 49
III.	 REGULATORY RESTRAINT	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 49
PART FOUR: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 51
I.	 FINDINGS
	 ...................................................51
II.	 RECOMMENDATIONS
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 ........................ .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .51
APPENDIX 1:	 ON-ORBIT FRAGMENTATIONS
	
. . . . . . . .	 .............. .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . A-1-1
APPENDIX 2:	 PRIVATE SECTOR INPUTS
	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . A-2-1
APPENDIX 3:	 BIBLIOGRAPHY
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . A-3-1
iii
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure	 Page
1 Altitude Distribution of Objects in Low Earth Orbit	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 2
2 Distribution of Objects in Geosynchronous Earth Orbit
	
.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 3
3 Kinetic Energy and Debris Effects Comparisons for Collisions at 10 km/sec	 .	 . . . . . . . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 5
4 Number of Cataloged Space Objects in Orbit 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 6
5 History of Fragmentation	 Events	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 8
6 Dispersion of Ariane	 16 Debris Fragments	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 9
7 Projected Growth of Accumulated Mass in LEO	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 13
8 Orbital Debris and Meteoroid Impacts on a Large "Space Station" Class Spacecraft
-	 1988	 &	 2010	 .	 .	 ..	 .	 ..	 .	 ..	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 ...	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 ..	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 15
9 Orbital Debris and Meteoroid Impacts on a Small Spacecraft - 1988 & 2010
	 . . . . . . . . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 16
10 Space Surveillance Network (SSN) Radars and Their Field of View at 500 km . . . . . . . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 21
11 Space Surveillance Network (SSN) Optical Sensors and Their Field of View at 500
km........................................................22
12 Sensor	 Altitude	 Limitations	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 23
13 The Orbital	 Debris Program	 Process	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 53
TABLES
1	 TRACKED OBJECTS BY ALTITUDE 	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2	 ESTIMATED DEBRIS POPULATION . . . .. . . . . . . 4............... ..
3	 SOURCES OF TRACKED OBJECTS BY ALTITUDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4	 CAUSES OF SATELLITE FRAGMENTATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5	 LAUNCH OPERATIONS	 ..........................................12
P,
GLOSSARY
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
AFSC Air Force Systems Command
ASSPACECOM Air Force Space Command
ASAT Anti-Satellite
CCD Charge Coupled Device (or Detector)
COLA Collision Avoidance on Launch
COMBO Computation of Miss Between Orbits
CNDB Civil Needs Data Base
COPUOS Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
COSPAR Committee on Space Research
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DECR Debris Environment Characterization Radar
DOC Department of Commerce
DoD Department of Defense
DOT Department of Transportation
ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle
EVA Extravehicular Activities
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
GEO Geosvnchronous Earth Orbit
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (USSR)
GOES Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
GPS Global Positioning System
GTO Geosvnchronous Transfer Orbit
IG-SPACE Interagency Group (Space)
ITU International Telecommunications Union
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
JSC Johnson Space Center
LDEF Long Duration Exposure Facility
LEO Low Earth Orbit
LRIR Long Range Imaging Radar
MEO Medium Earth Orbit
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
REDRAD Reentering Debris Radar
SAMTO Space and Missile Test Organization
SDI Strateeic Defense Initiative
SIG (SPACE) Senior Interagency Group (Space)
SPADOC Space Defense Operptions Center
SSC Space Surveillance Center
SSN Space Surveillance Network
UCT Uncorrelated Target
UCTP Uncorrelated Target Processor
USSPACECOM U.S. Space Command
WARC World Administrative Radio Conference
CHAPTER 1: THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
PART ONE: DIMENSIONS OF THE ORBITAL DEBRIS PROBLEM
CHAPTER 1: THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
INTRODUCTION
The natural meteoroid environment has histori-
cally been a design consideration for spacecraft. Me-
teoroids are part of the interplanetary environment
and sweep through earth orbital space at an average
speed of 20 km/sec. Observational data indicate that,
at any one time, a total of about 200 kg of meteor-
oid mass is within 2000 km of the earth's surface,
the region containing the most-used orbits. Most of
this mass is in meteoroids about 0.01 cm diameter;
lesser amounts of this mass are found in sizes both
smaller and larger than 0.01 cm. This natural me-
teoroid flux varies in time as the earth revolves
about the sun.
Man-made space debris (referred to as "orbital
debris" throughout the rest of this document) differs
from natural meteoroids because it remains in earth
orbit during its lifetime and is not transient through
the space around the earth. This study only considers
the orbital debris environment and not reentering
debris.
The estimated mass of man-made orbiting objects
within 2000 km of the earth's surface is about
3,000,000 kg (15,000 times more than the meteoroid
mass). These objects are in mostly high inclination
orbits and pass one another at an average relative
velocity of 10 km/sec (about 22,000 mph). Most of
this mass is contained in about 3000 spent rocket
stages, inactive satellites, and a comparatively few
active satellites. A smaller amount of mass, about
40,000 kg, is in the remaining 4000 objects currently
being tracked by space surveillance sensors.
Most of these smaller objects are the result of
over 130 on-orbit fragmentations (see Appendix 1
for a detailed list). Recent ground telescope measure-
ments of orbital debris combined with analysis of
hypervelocity impact pits (from man-made debris)
on returned surfaces of parts replaced on the Solar
Max satellite indicate a total mass of about 1000 kg
for orbital debris sizes of 1 cm or smaller, and about
300 kg for orbital debris smaller than .1 cm. This
distribution of mass and relative velocity is sufficient
to cause the orbital debris environment to be more
hazardous than the meteoroid environment to most
spacecraft operating in earth orbit below 2000 km
altitude.
Information about the current debris environ-
ment is extremely limited by the inability to effec-
tively track objects smaller than 10 cm in diameter.
The current Space Surveillance Network was not
designed to track small particles (less than 10 cm) of
debris as part of its mission. Furthermore, tech-
nological, natural and fiscal constraints limit the al-
ternatives for modifying existing sensors or adding
new systems.
This report is intended for internal agency and
interagency planning purposes only. New programs
or activities recommended in this report do not
reflect Administration approval and must compete
for funding in the budget process.
1. DESCRIPTION OF THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT
A. Background
Two types of orbital debris are of concern:
(1) Large objects (greater than 10 cm in diam-
eter) whose population, while small in absolute
terms, is large relative to the population of similar
masses in the natural debris environment; and
(2) A much greater number of smaller objects
(less than 10 cm diameter), whose size distribution
approximates natural meteoroids and which add to
the natural debris environment in those size ranges.
The interaction of these two classes of objects,
combined with their long residual times in orbit,
leads to further concern that inevitably there will be
collisions producing additional fragments and causing
the total debris population to grow.
The space around the earth is generally divided
into three orbital regimes:
(1) Low Earth Orbit (LEO) - defined by objects
orbiting the earth at less than 5500 km altitude: this
equates to orbital periods of less than 225 minutes.
600	 1000	 1500	 2000
ALTITUDE CKM]
-igure 1: Altitude Dist r ibution of Objects in Low Earth Orbit
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(2) Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) - defined by
objects orbiting the earth between LEO and GEO
altitudes.
(3) Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) - de-
fined by objects orbiting the earth at an altitude of
approximately 35,863 km; this equates to an orbital
period of approximately 24 hours.
Objects orbit the earth in two basic types of
orbits:
(1) Circular - the object remains at a near-
constant distance from the center of the earth for its
entire orbit. The object's velocity remains constant
throughout each revolution of the earth. Circular
orbits are special cases of the more general elliptical
orbits and only "approximate" true circles.
(2) Elliptical - the object's distance from the
center of the earth varies as it follows the shape of
an ellipse during each revolution. The closest point
of approach to the earth is called the object's peri-
gee; the farthest point from the earth is called the
object's apogee. Objects achieve maximum velocity
at perigee and achieve minimum velocity at apogee.
The greatest number of tracked objects are in
LEO, the next greatest are in GEO, and the remain-
ing objects are in MEO. Two new navigation systems
(the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and
U.S.S.R. Global Navigation Satellite System
(GLONASS) satellite constellations) are the first ma-
jor users of MEO.
A typical altitude distribution of objects tracked
(limited by sensor capability to objects greater than
10 cm in diameter) in LEO up to 2000 km is shown
in Figure 1, where the average number of objects at
2
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any one time is found in a 10 km altitude band is
plotted against altitude. The peak density is near 800
km, where the density is about 200 objects in a 10
km altitude band. At 350 to 500 km altitudes, where
and optical debris observations result in predictions
that the 7000 tracked objects represent only about
0.2% of the orbital debris population. Table 2 shows
the estimated debris population from both a numeric
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Figure 2: Distribution of Obj
the Space Station Freedom (hereinafter called Free-
dom Station) would operate, the density is about 20
to 50 objects in a 10 km altitude band.
Figure 2 shows a "snapshot" of objects tracked in
GEO by their longitude. The objects along the 0
degree latitude (equator) band are in geostationary
orbit. The other objects, for the most part, have a
slightly inclined orbit which causes them to trace a
figure-eight pattern on the ground about a point on
the equator, completing the pattern once every 24
hours.
B. Debris Distribution
U.S. Space Command presently maintains a cata-
log of more than 7000 objects in space. Due to
tracking limitations, the majority of these cataloged
objects are low earth orbiting objects and are 10 cm
in diameter or larger. As the altitude increases the
minimum sized detectable objects increases due to
sensor limitations. The breakdown of the tracked
objects, indicated by Table 1, reveals the relative
distribution of the objects by altitude as of August 1,
1988.
Extrapolation from the tracked objects, examina-
tion of various objects returned to earth, and radar
Small debris is normally defined. as objects small-
er than 10cm in diameter. Computer simulations
predict approximately 17,500 objects 1 - 10 cm in
diameter (about 0.5% of the total population) and
3,500,000 objects between 0.1 and 1 cm (99.3%).
However, observations from optical telescopes and
analysis of material retrieved from orbit are the only
current empirical data sources. Data derived from
these ground-based and in-space measurements re-
veal an increasing debris population with decreasing
debris piece size. Explosions of large objects have
the potential of producing a much larger number of
smaller objects, objects too small to be detected by
current space surveillance sensors. This is especially
true in high-intensity explosions, or in explosions
where the payload is designed to break up into some
particular size. It is theoretically possible for a single
100 kg payload to break up into 10' l cm objects or
into 10' 0.1 cm objects. A break-up due to a typical
hypervelocity collision involving a 100 kg payload
would probably create somewhat fewer objects, on
the order of 10' 1 cm objects or 10' 0.1 cm objects.
Low-intensity explosions could produce on the order
of 10' objects of either size. These estimates are
based on extrapolations from experimental data.
TABLE 1: TRACKED OBJECTS BY ALTITUDE
ORBIT TYPE	 LEO
	 MEO	 GEO
	
TOTAL
TOTAL TRACKED OBJECTS
	 5923	 683	 453
	
7059
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATED DEBRIS POPULATION
No. Objects	 % by No.	 Mass on Orbit
	 % by Mass
	
7,000
	
0.2%	 2,999,000 kg	 99.97%
	
17,500	 0.5%
	 1,000 kg	 0.03%
	
3,500,000
	
99.3%
	
3,524,500
	
100 %	 3,000,000 kg	 100 %
Size
> 10 cm
1-10 cm
<0.1-1 cm
Total
C. Orbital Lifetime
An orbiting object loses energy through friction
with the upper reaches of the atmosphere and var-
ious other orbit perturbing forces. Over time the
object falls into progressively lower orbits and even-
tually falls to the earth. As the object's potential
energy (represented by its altitude) is converted to
kinetic energy (energy due to its velocity), orbital
velocity must increase as the altitude decreases. As
an object's orbital trajectory draws closer to earth, it
speeds up and outpaces objects in higher orbits. In
short, a satellite's orbital altitude decreases gradually
while its orbital speed increases. Once an object
enters the measurable atmosphere, atmospheric drag
will slow it down rapidly and cause it to either burn
up or deorbit and fall to earth.
In LEO, unless reboosted, satellites in circular
orbits at altitudes of 200-400 km reenter the at-
mosphere within a few months. At 400 -900 km or-
bital altitudes, orbital lifetimes can exceed a year or
more depending upon the mass and area of the
satellite. For example, a glass marble in a circular
orbit at 500 km will stay aloft for about a year, but
if it were in orbit at 800 km it would stay up for 30
years. Above about 900 km altitudes, orbital
lifetimes can be 500 years or more. Satellite earth
orbit lifetimes are a function of drag and ballistic
coefficients. The more mass per unit area of the
object, the greater the ballistic coefficient and the
less the object will react to atmospheric drag. For
example, a fragment with a large area and low mass
(e.g., aluminum foil) has a low ballistic coefficient
and will decay much faster (and hence a shorter
orbital life) than a fragment with a small area and a
high mass (e.g., a ball bearing). The combination of
a variable atmosphere and unknown ballistic coeffi-
cients of space objects make decay and reentry pre-
diction difficult and inexact.
Orbital lifetimes for objects in elliptical orbits
can vary significantly from lifetimes of objects in
circular orbits. For elliptical orbits, the lower the
perigee altitude, the greater the atmospheric drag
effects. Therefore, considering a circular and an el-
tiptical orbit with equal energies, an object in an
elliptical orbit will have a higher apogee decay rate
and a shorter on-orbit lifetime.
The natural decay of earth-orbiting debris is also
greatly affected b y
 the eleven year solar cycle. The
last solar cycle peaked in 1981 and was above aver-
age in solar activity. The next solar cycle, expected
to peak in approximately 1990, is also predicted to
have significant impact on the natural decay rates.
High solar activity heats the earth's upper atmo-
sphere, which then expands and moves to higher
altitudes. With this heating, the upper atmosphere
density increases, causing satellites and debris to de-
cay more rapidly. As a result, the debris population
changes with solar activity depending on altitude.
Above 600 km, the atmospheric density is already so
low that the change in density does not noticeably
affect the debris population, but below 600 km there
are very noticeable changes. Over the course of the
average eleven year solar sun spot cycle, the earth's
atmosphere is excited and rises significantly above its
median altitude. However, this natural process of
"cleansing" (during the entire solar cycle) is ex-
tremely slow and alone cannot offset the present rate
of debris generation.
D. Debris Effects
The effects of orbital debris impacts depend on
velocity and mass of the debris. For debris of sizes
less than about 0.01cm, surface pitting and erosion
are the primary effects. Over a long period of time,
the cumulative effect of individual particles colliding
with a satellite might become significant since the
number of particles in this size range is very large in
LEO.
For debris larger than about 0.1 cm, structural
damage to the satellite becomes an important consid-
eration. For example, a 0.3 cm sphere of aluminum
traveling at 10 km/sec has about the same kinetic
energy as a bowling ball traveling at 100 kilometers
per hour (60 mph). It is reasonable to expect signifi-
cant structural damage to the satellite if such an
impact occurs.
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It is currently practical to shield against debris
particles up to lcm in diameter, a mass of 1.46
grams or 0.05 ounces. For larger sizes of debris,
cur rent shielding concepts become impractical. Ad-
vanced shielding concepts may make shielding
against particles up to 2 cm diameter reasonable but
it is possible that the only useful alternative strategy
for large particles will be avoidance. Fortunately, for
average size spacecraft the number of particles larger
than 10 cm is still small enough that a collision with
them is unlikely. For very large spacecraft, collision
probabilities are sufficiently high that an alternate
means of protection may be required.
For spacecraft design, it is useful to distinguish
three debris size ranges:-
• Sizes 0.01 cm and below produce surface ero-
sion.
• Sizes 0.01 cm - 1 cm produce significant
impact damage which can be serious, depend-
ing upon defensive design provisions.
• Objects larger than 1 cm can produce cata-
strophic damage.
Figure 3 shows the effects of representative sizes
of debris.
Since debris damage is a function of relative
velocity and velocities at geosynchronous altitudes
are low, the danger of impact is small and the
possible consequences are of less immediate concern
than in LEO. MEO, as one would expect, is an
intermediate case.
E. Uncertainty in the Orbital Debris Environment
There is a high degree of uncertainty in our
knowledge of the current orbital debris environment
and in our projections of the future environment.
Factors which contribute significantly to this uncer-
tainty are (1) limited measurements, (2) a lack of
predictability in the level of future space activities,
and (3) the indeterminate causes of breakup events
as major debris sources.
It is generally accepted that the low earth orbit
environment has been measured adequately by space
surveillance sensors for orbital debris sizes larger
than 10 cm, and these data provide a basic estimate
of the orbital debris population. Mathematical
models of spacecraft or rocket body breakups are
used to predict the sizes and number of fragments
smaller than 10 cm. These predictions are then com-
pared with limited telescope and special radar ob-
servations. The difference between the expected
number of objects to be detected and the number
actually observed becomes an estimate of the uncer-
tainty of the populations. Based upon these data, the
population density of the measured debris is known
to an uncertainty factor of two to five, depending
upon the diameter of the debris. However, for debris
0.1 - 1 cm, there are no confirmed measurements,
and the estimates given here are based on a linear
extrapolation which has an uncertainty factor of 10.
n
< .01 cm
	 — Surface Erosion
< .1 cm
	 Possibly Serious Damage
• .3 cm At 10 km/sec
	 Bowling Ball At(32,630 ft/sec)
	 60 mph (88 ft/sec)
1 cm Aluminum Sphere
	
400 lb. Safe At
At 10 km/sec
	
60 mph (88 ft/sec)
Figure 3: Kinetic Energy and Debris Effects Comparisons for Collisions at 10 km/sec
	 I
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II. SOURCES OF ORBITAL DEBRIS
A. General
Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. share roughly
equal responsibility for the current orbital debris
environment, although the rate of growth in Soviet-
related debris seems to be increasing, as shown in
Figure 4. The figure depicts the dramatic growth of
the cataloged satellite population between important
milestones of the space age despite a global launch
rate which has remained fairly constant for more
than twenty years. Only during 1978-1981 did the
catalog growth rate decline. This phenomenon was
not the work of man but of the elevation of the
atmosphere by a strong solar maximum. This signifi-
cantly accelerated the decay of satellites and debris
in orbits below about 600 km.
Satellite fragmentations (see para. I1.B.) are the
primary source for the recent climb in the Soviet
debris population: likewise, the single breakup of a
French Ariane rocket body in 1986 is responsible for
the large increase in debris from other spacefaring
nations and organizations.
Only 5% of the cataloged objects in earth orbit
represent operational spacecraft. The remainder con-
stitute varying types of orbital debris in fou r general
categories:
• Operational debris (12%) - objects intention-
ally discarded during satellite delivery or sat-
ellite operations, including lens caps,
separation and packing devices, spin-up
mechanisms, empty propellant tanks, payload
shrouds, or a few objects thrown away or
dropped during manned activities.
• Spent and intact rocket bodies (14%)
• Inactive (dead) payloads (20%)
• Fragmentation (49%)
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Figure 4: Number of Cataloged Space Objects In Orbit
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TABLE 3: SOURCES OF TRACKED OBJECTS BY ALTITUDE
ACTIVE/INACTIVE ROCKET FRAGMENTARY TOTA L
SPACECRAFT BODIES & OTHER DEBRIS
LEO 1134 651 4138 5923
MEO 232 302 149 683
GEO 329 123 1 453
TOTAL 1695 1076 4288 7059*
-- 472 tracked objects pending entry in the catalog
Thus, 95 %o of the cataloged objects in earth orbit
can be considered orbital debris; 100% of the objects
are potential sources for more debris should further
breakup occur.
Table 3 presents the altitude distribution of the
sources of tracked objects discussed above. As shown
by the table, the majority of tracked objects are in
LEO. This is an indication both of the capabilities of
the tracking sensors and of the level of space activity
in LEO.
In addition to launches, operations and fragmen-
tations, satellite deteriorations (the decomposition of
thermal blankets and the cracking and peeling of
spacecraft paints) are a potentially significant source
of small size orbital debris. However, such debris are
not in the satellite catalog since they are undetec-
table due to their very small size and poor reflectiv-
ity.
B. Fragmentation
Since the first recognized fragmentation in June,
1961, over 130 objects (payloads, rocket bodies, and
other debris) have experienced on-orbit breakups.
On-orbit fragmentations may result from explosions
or collisions, and may be intentional or accidental.
An object may be deliberately destroyed by an explo-
sive charge as part of a spacecraft test, or a rocket
stage may suffer a catastrophic propulsion failure
leading to an explosion. Collisions are less common,
with a few candidate cases still being investigated.
The major contributor to the increase in orbital
debris in recent vears has been the U.S.S.R.'s delib-
erate destruction of military satellites which have
malfunctioned, perhaps in an effort to keep them
from falling into unfriendly hands. The causes of
many fragmentations (45%) remain unknown, in
part due to the limited data available for analysis.
Table 4 lists the causes of fragmentations as cur-
rently known.
Of particular- concern is the sustained and, in-
deed increasing, rate of fragmentation events.
Whereas this trend was mitigated in the first part of
the 1980s b y a decrease in the observed number of
debris per event, today we are witnessing a high rate
of myriad multi-particle fragmentations (see Appen-
dix 1 and Figure 5).
Between June 1, 1987 and June 1, 1988, ten
satellite breakups occurred of which 7 involved pay-
loads, 2 were rocket bodies, and 1 was a satellite
shroud. The national origins of the objects were
eight U.S.S.R.. one U.S., and one E.S.A. Particularly
disturbing is the increase of large fragmentations in
the lower altitude regimes traveled by manned
spacecraft. This increase represents a potential threat
to the safety of manned operations in space.
The Ariane Spot 1 rocket body represents the
single greatest source of debris now in orbit about
the earth. Figure 6 shows the orbital planes of the
debris immediately after explosion and one year after
the breakup. Each line indicates only the orbital
track of a single small fragment not a solid band of
debris. Right after a fragmentation, the debris quick-
ly forms a ring within a narrow band of orbital
planes constrained by the changes in inclination,
normally a degree or less. The orbits are also con-
strained in altitude by changes in the perigee and
apogee, normally several hundred kilometers. How-
ever, the orbital planes begin to spread apart. The
rate of this separation is a function of inclination
and mean altitude of the debris. Eventually, debris
cloud dispersion has advanced to such an extent that
the tracks of the orbiting debris trace a thin shell
about the earth with a hole centered at each pole.
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TABLE 4: CAUSES OF SATELLITE FRAGMENTATIONS
11	 Percent	 Per Cent of Total
Cause	 Events	 Fragmentation Debris
Unknown	 45	 37
Deliberate	 40	 36
Propulsion Related	 15	 27
TOTAL_
U S	
-------
U.S.S R. -•-•-•-
1961	 1965	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1985	 1988
YEAR
Figure 5: History of Fragmentation events
The rate of debris-producing collisions varies as
the square of the number of objects in space. If it is
assumed that the number of objects is proportional
to the amount of mass in orbit, (a conservative
assumption) then a doubling of the amount of mass
in orbit would lead to a factor of four increase in
the rate of debris-producing collisions.
Collisions between objects in LEO are expected
to occur at an average velocity of 10 km/sec. At such
velocities, the impact shock wave creates such tem-
peratures and pressures internal to the materials to
cause them to melt and millions of particles to be
created. Because of this phenomenon, a hyperveloc-
ity (approximately 5-10 km/sec) collision produces
many more minute particles than a chemical explo-
sion or a pressure rupture.
Based on the current and projected growth of
debris population density, there is a greater than
50% probability that one or more such catastrophic
collisions will occur between trackable debris objects
by the year 2000.
If explosions have occurred in GEO, few frag-
ments would have been detected due to sensor limi-
tations. Also, non-operational satellites in GEO are
8
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Figure 6: Dispersion of Debris Fragments of Nov 1986 breakup of Ariane flight 16
upper stage. Each line indicates only the orbital track of a single small fragment -
not a solid band of debris.
frequently not tracked for long periods of time dw--
ing which unobserved fragmentations could occur.
Currently, we are able to catalog only objects larger
than 30 cm, and most likely 1 m, in GEO. In the
absence of data to the contrary, it is believed that
there is not a significant number of objects in GEO
to cause a problem at this time, but increasing num-
bers may create a problem in the future.
C. Satellite Deterioration and Solid Propellant
Particles
Very small orbital debris particles (sizes less than
0.05cm) are created by disintegration of spacecraft
surfaces (paint flaking, plastic and metal erosion)
and by the firing of solid propellant motors, which
produce aluminum oxide particles. Thousands of
pounds of aluminum oxide dust are introduced each
year to the space environment as a result of solid
rockets fired to transfer payloads from LEO to
GEO. A single rocket can be responsible for placing
billions of particles in space (2,000 to 12,000 kg of
aluminum oxide). Since the transfer orbits are ellip-
tical orbits, most of the particles reenter quickly
because of the effects of atmospheric drag and other
forces at the orbit perigee. But the small fraction of
particles that remains in orbit is still of concern. Due
to the large number of particles ejected by each
motor, these aluminum oxide particles can represent
a significant surface erosion and contamination
threat to spacecraft.
The disintegration of spacecraft exterior paints
believed to be caused by atomic oxygen erosion of
the organic binder of the paint is another major
source of small debris in LEO. Stage and spacecraft
separation processes that occur in orbit also fre-
quently release small debris.
D. Uncertainties
Although the consequences of every satellite
breakup are unique, even for identical satellites,
some general trends can be stated based on observa-
tions and modeling. Statistically, rocket body frag-
mentations create an average of 125 trackable pieces
of debris per event while a payload fragmentation
creates an average of only 50 trackable pieces. There
is considerable uncertainty in these figures, however,
since the official satellite catalog may not include
debris in very low LEO that reenters relatively
quickly nor debris in GEO (if GEO breakups have
indeed occurred) that may be untrackable due to
sensor limitations.
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I.TRENDS
A. Launch Activity
Space activity is placing debris in orbit faster
than the natural effects of drag removes it, with the
result that the tracked population of orbital debris is
increasing by about 300 objects per year during a
time when launch rates are fairly constant. This rate
of increase includes only debris having sizes of 10
cm or larger. The increase in number of smaller
objects may be much larger.
For the first 25 years of man's involvement in
space, only the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. launched sig-
nificant numbers of spacecraft. Currently, six coun-
tries and Arianespace, the European launch
corporation, are capable of launching objects into
earth orbit. Launch rates for the last nine years are
illustrated in Table 5.
B. Debris Modeling
In order to project the future debris environ-
ment, assumptions have to be made concerning de-
bris sources and solar activity. With regard to debris
sources, assumptions have to be made concerning
launch and fragmentation rates. Random collision
fragmentation is tied to the assumptions made about
the launch rates. Uncertainties derive from observa-
tional limitations, unmodeled sources, and unpredict-
able solar activity.
The currently used NASA debris model makes
the following baseline assumptions:
(1) The rate of growth of the trackable debris
population has fluctuated over the years with the
solar cycle, launch activity, and operational practices.
The model assumes that no further preventative
measures will take place, and that operational prac-
tices will not change. The launch rate used by the
model is generated by combining three traffic
models: a NASA model called the Civil Needs Data
Base (CNDB) which includes U.S. civil government
and commercial missions; a DoD model for national
defense related missions; and a contractor-developed
model for foreign government and commercial mis-
sions. This combined traffic model projects con-
strained (low), nominal (medium), and high levels of
space launch activity.* Projected space launch activ-
ity includes planned SDI testing, but makes no as-
sumptions about deployment of space-based ballistic
missile defense systems. Such deployment would pro-
duce some increase in launch activity. Development
of technologies to cause spent boosters and payloads
to reenter might eliminate or substantially reduce the
deployment phase increase of mass in orbit.
(2) The population of small untracked debris is
expected to increase at an even faster rate than the
tracked debris. This is because, as the population of
tracked debris grows, collisions will begin to occur
with increasing frequency. Hypervelocity collisions
generate very large numbers of small debris particles.
As a consequence, it is reasonable to suppose that
the untracked debris population will increase at
about double the rate of growth of the trackable
population.
(3) After the next peak in the solar cycle (circa
1990), it is assumed that solar activity peaks will be
of average intensity.
Future small debris may originate primarily from
random collisions between orbiting objects. Because
of the possibility of cascading collisions (collisions
created by previous collisions), the small debris may
increase at a much faster rate than can be predicted
by using the launch rate alone.
*The Civil Needs Data Base (CNDB), version 1.1 was utilized in estimating U.S. civil/U.S. -launched foreign traffic; Option I (the Core
program), II (the Baseline program), and IV (Aggressive expansion) are represented in the Constrained, Nominal, and High traffic model,
respectively. Department of Defense (DoD) Constrained models are used for the Constrained traffic model, whereas the DoD nominal growth
model appears in Nominal and High traffic models. ( DoD Space Transportation Mission Requirements Definition, Aerospace Report
TOR-0086A (2460-01)-1, Volume 1, December 1986, updated Dec 87.) Rocket bodies and associated upper stages are not manifested in
either of these data bases and thus their dry
 masses are not included in the mass totals. Also, servicing or retrieval missions.. which leave no
mass in orbit, and such expendable payloads as fuel, are excluded from the tally. Estimates of long-lived foreign mass are derived from
Johnson's History and Projections of Foreign Satellite Mass to Earth Orbit (Teledyne Brown Engineering CS86-USASDC-0015, July 1986.)
The dry masses of rocket bodies and upper stages are included in these mass totals. Since these projections for foreign traffic extend to the
year 2000 only, foreign mass deposition is assumed constant after the year 2000.
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TABLE 5: LAUNCH OPERATIONS
Number of Successful Launches in Given Year
Country
or Organization 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988'
U.S.S.R. 89 98 101 98 97 97 91 93 70
United States 12 18 18 22 21 17 6 9 10
Japan 2 3 1 3 3 2 2 3 2
India 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
China 0 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 3
Arianespace 0 2 0 2 4 3 2 2 5
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 l
Totals 104 123 121 127 128 120 103 109 91	 1:
' as of 9/29/88
C. Debris Generation Projections
The major source of both large and small debris
in LEO has been fragmentation of satellites and
rocket bodies. This process has produced more large,
trackable debris than has space operations, and very
much more small untrackable debris. The launching
of a payload into space from a booster or upper
stage generates orbital debris composed of spent
rocket stages, clamps, shrouds, covers, etc., but does
not produce much untrackable debris (sizes smaller
than 10 cm) in LEO.
If our current launch procedures continue, along
with a high rate of fragmentation events, and launch
rates increase, then debris generation rates will cer-
tainly increase. Figure 7 illustrates the past accu-
mulation of mass in LEO (using U.S. Space
Command data) and shows the projected accumula-
tion using the traffic models described above. These
traffic models predict an increasing debris growth
rate such that, unless efforts are taken to moderate
debris generation, an accumulation of between 8.5
million kg and 12.2 million kg in LEO will be
reached by the year 2010.
The rate that the population of small uncataloged
debris increases is a very sensitive function of the
accumulation rate of mass in orbit and the effective-
ness of efforts to moderate debris generation. For
example, the NASA orbital debris model predicts
that, if future launch activity follows the constrained
traffic model, and efforts are taken to moderate
debris (e.g. eliminating future on-orbit explosions
and planning the reentering of upper stages), then a
"stable" orbital debris environment might ensue.
That is, even though the uncataloged population will
increase with time, it would someday, perhaps a
century from now, reach a "steady-state" condition
where small debris is removed at the same rate at
which it is generated. While this steady-state con-
dition may require more protection for spacecraft
than is required today, it would not be so severe as
to preclude operations.
On the other hand, if future launch activity fol-
lows the nominal traffic model (ie. continues to
escalate past the year 2010), and if no further efforts
are taken to moderate debris, then an unstable envi-
ronment may eventually ensue. That is, a critical
density of objects could be reached, causing a very
rapid, runaway increase in the debris population.
During such a stage, the number of objects in orbit
could be so large that random collisions occur at
shorter and shorter intervals as each event creates
particles which then can collide with other particles.
The operational environment would then become
highly unstable. Although such a condition would
not prohibit launching vehicles, some altitude bands
and inclinations would become too hazardous for
operation of future spacecraft.
Mathematical models indicate that a continuing
escalation of the nominal traffic model with no fur-
ther debris controls could lead to a critical density
sometime before the middle of the 21st century, and
an unstable environment could occur sometime in
the latter half of the 21st century, depending on
what actions are taken after the critical density is
reached. Once a critical density is reached, the only
alternative for stopping a runaway is to increase the
rate at which objects are removed from the environ-
ment. Using today's technology, this would require
the expensive technique of retrieval.
There is some uncertainty in these predictions.
As to whether a simple continuation of the nominal
and constrained traffic models, with no increases in
efforts to moderate debris, will lead to a stable or
unstable environment is not entirely clear. In any
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case, it is clear- that efforts to moderate debris gen-
eration would result in a less hazardous environ-
ment.
Reducing uncertainty in predictions about the
future environment would require improving the fi-
delity of existing models.
Regarding the situation in both LEO and GEO,
although significant uncertainties exist, the following
conclusions, if current trends continue, seem un-
avoidable:
(1) Collisional breakup of space objects will
become a source for additional orbital debris in the
near future, possibly before the year 2000.
(2) Over a longer period of time, the orbital
debris environment will increase with time, even
though a zero net input rate may be maintained.
Ultimately, this could lead to a stable but hazardous
situation or, worse, an unstable environment with a
subsequent cascading effect.
The discussion in the preceding paragraphs has
been limited to LEO. The situation is considerably
different in GEO. There are currently about 453
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Figure 7: Projected Growth of Accumulated Mass in LEO
NOTE Because the size, shape and mass of cataloged objects in orbit vary to such
an extreme, mass in orbit was chosen as the most representative variable.
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cataloged objects that traverse GEO altitudes, of
which only about 150 are geostationary. The others
are in either geosynchronous or semi-synchronous,
highly elliptical ("Molniya") orbits. The average spa-
tial density of objects is 2 to 3 orders of magnitude
less than in LEO, so that the likelihood of a collision
is not significant at present. However, local "bunch-
ing" of satellites in at least six prime service loca-
tions can increase collision probabilities by factors of
100. Nonetheless, the relative velocities are inher-
ently low. Even GEO transfer stage velocities are
below 2 km/sec. Hence, the near-term concern for-
debris in GEO is less compelling than for LEO.
D. Light Pollution
Astronomers are now beginning to experience
problems in their- work because of debris effects.
There have been cases of confusion about whether-
an object observed is an item of scientific interest or
a piece of debris. Additionally, as the debris popula-
tion grows, the amount of light reflected by the
debris also grows. In a field where minute differ-
ences in degree can have significant meanings, such
"light pollution" of the sky can hinder astronomical
efforts.
II. IMPLICATIONS
The probability of collision is a function of the
spacecraft size, the orbital altitude and the period of
time that the spacecraft will remain in orbit. The
orbital debris environment in LEO presents a prob-
lem even now for space operations which involve
large spacecraft in orbit or satellites in orbit for long
periods of time. A "space station" is the primary
example of such a spacecraft, and it will be necessary
to shield it over large areas in order- to achieve the
design safety criteria.
The "design driver" is the determination of an
acceptable level of risk. For example, the specified
level of risk for manned space programs from Apol-
lo to the present has been essentially constant at .005
probability of penetration over the lifetime of the
space system. The actual level of risk experienced by
these spacecraft has been significantly less than that
specified because other- design requirements made
the spacecraft more robust. The earlier- manned
space programs addressed only the natural meteoroid
environment but the current Shuttle and proposed
Freedom Station requirement addresses both the nat-
Ln-al meteoroid and the orbital debris environments.
Substantial growth of the debris environment may
also require additional shielding for smaller satellites.
In order to visualize the implications of orbital
debris growth, it is helpful to consider two illustra-
tive cases. One is a "space station" of the general
size of the future Space Station Freedom, operating
at 500 km. The probabilities of impact are approxi-
mate, based on equivalent surface area and do not
account for: directional effects and the relative ori-
entation of component elements. The other is a
typical small satellite operating at the LEO most
popular satellite altitude of 800 km. For each of
these cases, we will compare the effects of the cur-
rent debris environment with the effects of the in-
creased debris environment which will result if
growth of the tracked population continues at a rate
midway between the nominal and constrained traffic
models shown in Figure 7.
A "space station" case for the 1988 debris popu-
lation is illustrated in Figure S. The average number
of impacts per vear is plotted against the debris
object size in centimeters. Inspection of the figure
shows that in the 1988 environment the chance of a
1 cm or larger object striking this "space station" is
predicted to be one possibility in twenty years. It
would be necessary to take protective measures for
this "space station, shielding it for objects at 1 cm
and smaller, and either accepting the low probability
of impact by a larger- object or by providing collision
avoidance for larger objects. This is the case even if
there were to be no growth of the current debris
population. Impacts with objects too small to cause
penetrations or other significant structural damage
will be much more frequent. About 50,000 impacts
of .01 cm particles would occur each year. Surface
erosion could occur as a result, which may be a
problem for some sensitive surfaces, such as optics
or solar panels, over the lifetime of the Freedom
Station.
The impact rate on this "space station" for the
projected 2010 population is also shown in Figure 8.
The probability of a 1 cm or larger object striking
the "space station" in the 2010 environment is pre-
dicted to be one possibility in two years. Collision
avoidance maneuvers would become five times more
frequent. If the 0.01 cm and smaller debris popula-
tion grew as projected, erosion of protective surfaces
designed to minimize atomic oxygen attack could
become a serious problem.
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The small satellite case for the 1988 debris popu- 	The effect of population growth by the year 2010
	
lation is illustrated in Figure 9. Inspection of this	 on the typical small spacecraft is also illustrated in
	
figure shows that in such an environment, the	 Figure 9. At that time, the chance of a catastrophic
	
chance of a catastrophic collision with a 1 cm or	 collision with a 1 cm or larger particle is predicted
	
larger object is predicted to occur once in 950 years. 	 to be one in 110, which is still not a major concern
	
Only erosive effects due to smaller debris impacts	 for most spacecraft. However, about ten 0.1 cm
	
are significant for spacecraft operation in this case. 	 particles will strike the spacecraft each year, which
	
A few hundred or thousand impacts of debris small- 	 will make some form of shielding or some other
	
er than 0.01 cm. will occur each year. Surface ero-	 form of protection technique mandatory. Surface
	
sion could be a problem for sensitive surfaces. The	 erosion rates will be increased an order of mag-
	
lower probability of significant impact is because the	 nitude, which could produce problems for optical
	
exposed area of this spacecraft is more than two	 surfaces.
orders of magnitude less than a "space station", even
though the debris environment at 800 km is five
times more hazardous than that at 500 km.
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Another very important consideration is ex-
travehicular activities (EVA), since crewmen are ex-
posed to the debris impact risk during extravehicular
operations. The risk is a function of the exposure
length and the capability of the EVA suit to resist
impact events. The primary hazard is significant
growth in small debris due to hypervelocity colli-
sions. As the environment becomes a greater threat,
the suit design requires greater structural capability
to maintain a specified level of risk. Such increased
structural capability can compromise the crewman's
mobility and EVA effectiveness.
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CHAPTER 3: EXISTING POLICIES CONCERNING SPACE DEBRIS
INTRODUCTION
Although agency policies concerning orbital de-
bris are only just forming, orbital debris consider-
ations have al r eady caused changes in the plans and
activities of some agencies. Some policies and activi-
ties are motivated by the need to protect a
spacecraft; others are designed to prevent debris pro-
liferation. Efforts have come in four distinct areas.
First, preliminary research is underway to define the
debris environment more precisely. Second, ways to
reduce data management limitations are being ex-
plored. Third, several operational procedures are be-
ing adopted to limit growth in the debris population.
Finally, the design philosophies for future missions
and spacecraft are beginning to address debris con-
siderations.
In addition to describing current policies and
activities, the chapters in Part Two discuss a variety
of options for better defining the debris environment
and affecting changes in designs and operations so as
to reduce the threat posed by orbiting debris. The
chapters also identify research and development ef-
forts required to provide the technologies essential to
accomplishing these options. Chapter 3 describes ex-
isting national and agency policies concerning orbital
debris. Chapter 4 discusses what can be done to
better define the orbital debris environment through
improved monitoring. Chapter 5 discusses how to
improve our ability to handle the vast data process-
ing and data base maintenance requirements asso-
ciated with defining the debris environment. Chapter
6 addresses ways to minimize debris propagation
through launcher and spacecraft design and oper-
ational procedures. Chapter 7 discusses options for
surviving the debris environment that are available
to any user of space, recognizing that the debris
population will continue to grow even as actions are
being implemented to reduce the rate of growth. In
each of these discussions, one must recognize that
few of these policies or actions can be wholly effec-
tive without cooperative efforts by other spacefaring
nations.
I. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY
The National Space Policy, signed by President
Reagan in February 1988, included a statement that
"all space sectors will seek to minimize the creation
of space debris. Design and operations of space tests,
experiments and systems will strive to minimize or
reduce accumulation of space debris consistent with
mission requirements and cost effectiveness". Except
for this single statement, no comprehensive national
policy concerning orbital debris currently exists.
(The U.S. is a signatory to the Liability Convention
of 1972, however, this multinational agreement does
not specifically address orbital debris. See Chapter 9,
Legal Issues.)
II. LIMITED AGENCY POLICIES
Similarly, comprehensive agency policies or com-
mercial regulations concerning orbital debris cur-
rently do not exist. America's space program is
divided into two categories: government programs
affected by law, administration policies and internal
agency directives; and commercial programs affected
by law, regulation, and licenses. Each category is
affected by different processes, constraints and phi-
losophies. There are some limited policy statements
and regulating mechanisms, however, which address
some debris considerations. Also, de facto policies
exist through the adoption of debris-mitigating pro-
cedures or philosophies. Examples of limited policies
are:
(1) Perhaps the most significant debris-reduction
policy has been the NASA requirement instituted in
1982 for the venting of the unspent propellants and
gases from Delta upper stages to prevent explosions
due to the mixing of fuel residues. No U.S. hyper-
golic stages have inadvertently exploded in space
since the institution of this requirement.
(2) DoD Space Policy, issued in February 1987,
broke new ground by expressly addressing orbital
debris as a factor in the planning of military space
operations. This guidance was also included in the
recent national space policy for all space sectors.
Both policies call for positive efforts to minimize the
creation of space debris. The DoD space policy
states:
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"DoD will seek to minimize the impact of
space debris on its military operations. Design
and operations of DoD space tests, experi-
ments and systems will strive to minimize or
reduce accumulation of space debris consis-
tent with mission requirements."
(3) Air Force (AFSC, Space Division) regulation
SDR 55-1 directs program directors and managers to
adjust satellite development and deployment plans to
avoid orbital positioning problems. It applies to ini-
tial satellite placement and subsequent repositioning.
That is, level of congestion must be considered when
planning a final orbit location or transfer. This refers
to both geosynchronous as well as lower altitude
satellites.
(4) NOAA and several DoD programs boost
their satellites which are no longer functional into
orbits above GEO to prevent the creation of addi-
tional debris by inadvertent collisions with drifting
satellites and to free valuable orbital slots.
(5) All commercial activities subject to DOT's
authority are subject to the Office of Commercial
Space Transportation's regulations established in
Chapter III, 14 CFR Part III. These regulations re-
quire each applicant to address safety issues with
respect to its launch, including the risks of associated
orbital debris, on-orbit safety, and reentry hazards.
(6) The FCC has requested comment from its
Advisory Committee for ITU WARC-ORB-88 on the
need for the regulation of the removal of satellites
from the GEO following expiration of useful life.
The Committee indicated that the cur rent practice of
some satellite operators is to use onboard fuel to
boost retired satellites above the GEO at the expira-
tion of the spacecraft's useful life. Fu r thermore, be-
cause current understanding of the GEO
environment indicated that the possibility of space
collision with a retired spacecraft was remote, the
Committee stated that the benefit of legal and com-
pliance verification regimes would not justify the
cost. The Advisory Committee further noted that
this appears at present to be either a non-problem or
one that would be addressed more cost-effectively on
an ad-hoc basis. Based on these comments, the FCC
determined that the problem was not of sufficient
magnitude to warrant the adoption of formal rules at
this time.
I11. FURTHER ONGOING EFFORTS
There is a growing recognition within the Federal
government that more formal mechanisms need to
be established for addressing debris considerations.
Efforts to define the problems and to identify op-
tions for dealing with them are expanding. For ex-
ample:
(1) NASA has created an in-house Orbital
Debris Steering Group to examine potential NASA
policies and procedures and to make recommenda-
tions to the Administrator as to proper approaches
to orbital debris problems. Basic and applied re-
search about debris impact behavior and spacecraft
shielding is ongoing to provide input to both policy
formulation and the design of the Freedom Station
and other spacecraft.
(2) DOT conducts research activities at the
Transportation Systems Center and its contractors. A
recent report, entitled "Hazard Analysis of Commer-
cial Space Transportation (Vol. I: Operations; Vol.
II: Hazards; Vol. III: Risk Analysis"), devotes explicit
attention to orbital and reentry hazards, and to the
management of space debris hazards. Current re-
search is aimed at comparing the relative operational
space safety and debris type/number characteristics
for existing commercial ELVs, both generically (e.g.,
typical parking and GTO orbits, and orbital life of
operational debris) and for specific proposed mis-
sions. Further research focuses on the development
of rational, risk-based insurance requirements and
regulatory standards for the commercial space in-
dustry.
(3) DoD and NASA are jointly working on the
Smart Catalog, an effort to define the orbital debris
environment. The current Space Surveillance Net-
work (SSN) discretely tracks space objects greater
than 10 cm. Smaller objects cannot be discretely
tracked, but can be statistically modeled. These two
different types of information form different types
of data bases. The Smart Catalog will combine these
data bases into one hybrid data base.
(4) DoD and NASA maintain a continuing effort
to understand the debris hazard and model the ef-
fects of explosions and collisions. The research aids
satellite and booster program offices by assessing
vehicle-specific debris hazards and debris abatement
options.
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	(5) Operating under the Space and Missile Test	 space by SDIO and the Services. A key objective is
	
Organization (SAMTO), DoD has established a tri- 	 better control of proliferation of space debris by
	
service Space Test Range Organization to coordinate	 institutionalizing the support elements previously or-
	
and oversee the safe conduct of testing performed in	 ganized for each test.
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I, CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND RESEARCH
The Space Surveillance Network (SSN), which is
operated primarily by DoD, is tasked to monitor
man-made objects in space. To accomplish this task,
a world-wide array of sensors has been established.
The observations from these sensors are compiled
into a single database and its associated document-
-the Satellite Catalog. There are currently over 7,000
objects large enough to be detected, tracked. and
cataloged. There are perhaps millions more objects
that are too small to be detected and tracked consis-
tentiy. The SSN sensors provide positional data on
the objects and a rough approximation of size. using
data from these and other sources, various char-
acteristics about the debris are studied, including
radar reflectivity, shape, mass, velocity and orbital
inclination.
Figures 10 and 11 show the location of the SSN
sensors. These sensors can be divided into two cate-
gories: l) radars, used for detection and tracking of
objects in both LEO and GEO and, 2) optical, used
primarily for detection and tracking of GEO objects.
At GEO altitudes, the detection capability of optical
systems is significantly better than that of radar
systems.
Figure 12 shows the altitudes covered for each
category of sensor, and the size of objects each is
capable of detecting. Observations gathered from
these sensors are used in developing a model of the
debris environment and its behavior. This model is
then used to predict various trends and measure-
ments. As the figure illustrates, the minimum size
object that can be detected is about 10 cm diameter.
For a given type of sensor (radar or optical), the
higher the altitude of an object the larger the object
must be for the SSN sensors to track it. This limita-
tion is significant due to the estimated large number
of objects smaller than this size threshold.
Other limitations significantly affect the SSN ca-
pability to detect and track orbital debris. The limi-
tations of the current data management capability
are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The limitations
due to a lack of resource availability are created by
an already overtasked SSN. By employing special
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Figure 10: Space Surveillance Network (SSN) Radars and Their Field of View at 500 km.
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techniques, SSN sensors could be used to detect
smaller orbital debris objects; however, these tech-
niques involve the use of SSN sensors for extended
time periods (over 4,000 hrs), which places an ex-
treme burden on the normal SSN mission.
Because of current detection limitations, observa-
tion data inputs to the models are limited. The lack
of data on small objects necessitates reliance on
modeling of breakup events, which are a major con-
tributor to the small debris population. Therefore, it
is necessary to study breakups in detail, both experi-
mentally and theoretically, in order to satisfactorily
model the small debris environment.
Collision analysis studies, currently underway,
provide the capability to examine breakup phenom-
ena under laboratory conditions. Refinements in
these studies could provide input data for modeling
the effects of hypervelocity satellite collisions and for
making risk assessments. Because impacts in low
earth orbit occur with an average speed of 10
km/sec, specialized equipment (such as a hyperveloc-
ity gun) is needed to create and monitor realistic
impact events. Current and future studies include:
(1) gun research and development, (2) hypervelocity
impact research testing, to determine the effect of
collisions on various materials and spacecraft struc-
tures configurations, (3) hypervelocity impact model-
ing, and (4) spacecraft sub-system and component
impact testing and analysis.
II. OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT AND FU-
TURE RESEARCH
Several options are available to improve the de-
tection, tracking, and monitoring capabilities of the
SSN. Technology exists to allow us to increase the
number of objects which can be cataloged and also
to begin statistically characterizing the debris popula-
tion in earth orbit. A combination of approaches
including modifications to existin g ground based sen-
sors, development of space based space surveillance,
and new data management and data processing con-
cepts may be necessary.
A lead role for USSPACECOM in the operation
of ground- or space-based radars to track orbital
debris is desirable in view of the current US-
SPACECOM mission, ongoing development projects
and current tracking capabilities, and is a prudent
step necessary to avoid duplication. A lead role for
NASA in modeling and statistical analyses of debris
measurements is desirable in view of its expertise,
experience and ongoing projects in these areas.
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Figure 12: Sensor Altitude Limitations
In considering the development, modification, de-
ployment, and employment of sensors, it will be
necessary to ensure that there are no conflicts with
international obligations, in particular the ABM
Treaty. Proposals which may be affected by Treaty
provisions should be reviewed by appropriate com-
pliance authorities, such as the DoD Compliance
Review Group. For example, the Treaty contains
restrictions on large phased-array and early warning
radars; consequently, proposed improvements to bal-
listic missile early warning radars should be reviewed
to ensure they are not inconsistent with these restric-
tions.
A. Evaluate and Exploit Existing Capabilities
(1) Studies of Measurement Capabilities The
existing Space Surveillance Network sensors are used
to a limited extent to take measurements of the
orbital debris environment. A study could be con-
ducted to determine the potential contribution of
each sensor to an operational, smaller size debris
monitoring system. A study group consisting of DoD
and NASA could conduct the effort.
(2) Trade-off and System Studies If the study
of the current space surveillance sensors shows inad-
equate capability to collect orbital debris data, the
value of upgrading existing sensors must be investi-
gated. As a minimum, the following factors need to
be considered in this study:
A. Impact of adding the debris data collec-
tion mission to the primary mission of exist-
ing sensors.
B. Cost and technical trade-offs associated
with making the necessary modifications to
enable the Space Surveillance Network to col-
lect orbital debris data at a higher rate.
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This study effort to include preparation of a
debris data collection plan could be led by DoD and
NASA.
(3) Debris Measurements If the Space Surveil-
lance Network can contribute resources to debris
measurement, designated sensors could begin collect-
ing orbital debris data to the extent that primary
sensor missions are not impaired. This data collec-
tion effort would support a study, the purpose of
which is two-fold:
A. To begin baselining the debris environ-
ment in low earth orbit as soon as is prac-
tical, and
B. To empirically assess the Space
Surveillance Center's ability to process and
analyze this type and quantity of data.
This study could be conducted by DoD, with data
analysis responsibilities shared by DoD and NASA.
Analysts at all the agencies are already highly tasked;
consequently, staff augmentation or use of contractor
support may be required. The data collection effort
and follow-on study could begin immediately after
completion of the trade-off and system studies.
B. Expansion of Existing Capabilities - Radars
(1) Increase Power on Existing Collateral Radars
Increasing the power output of a radar will increase
its detection capability. With increased power, a ra-
dar could either detect smaller objects or detect at
increased ranges or a combination of both. However,
increasing the output power of a radar generally is
not easy and is impossible for some systems. In any
case, a power increase for a radar would be a costly
modification.
Implementation of this option would require
hardware additions to existing sensors. Increased
power could also have adverse impacts to environ-
mental concerns, and could provide more data than
can be handled by the data management system.
(2) Debris Environment Characterization Radar
(DECR) Both NASA and MIT/Lincoln Laboratory
have suggested using a narrow beam radar to begin
physically defining the debris population in low
earth orbit. NASA suggests developing a relatively
small radar to statistically characterize small debris
objects (1.0 cm or larger) at 500 km altitude on a
routine basis. NASA's interest in developing this
radar arises from the requirements to provide cri-
teria for collision avoidance and for spacecraft
shielding design for the planned Freedom Station.
This radar would help to validate the models
currently being presented as "representative of the
debris environment". Further, such a radar could
conceivably help with early monitoring of breakups
and serve as a supplementary method for determin-
ing the sources of small debris. By mapping the
distribution and density of debris clouds, it could
begin to verify the differences in cloud propagation
resulting from collisions versus explosions. A dedi-
cated debris radar could also alleviate problems of
trying to obtain observation time on already heavily
used tracking radars.
The development effort could be relatively minor
since the proposed system consists of off-the-shelf
hardware. Also, siting the radar with other SSN
assets could reduce site preparation and support re-
quirements. It is uncertain who would provide long-
term operations and maintenance support in the
budget process and how the site would be selected.
Funding has been approved for the preparation of
the Request for Proposals (RFP). NASA has planned
to incrementally fund the development and fabrica-
tion of the radar.
The radar should be located as near to the equa-
tor as possible (preferably between 0 and 7 degrees
latitude) to permit observation of debris regardless
of orbital inclination. It would enhance effectiveness
to locate the radar near an existing radar to permit
the identification of larger objects within the
sidelobes of the DECR by means of cross correlation
and checking between the two radars. NASA could
be the lead agency for design and construction of
this radar.
While the DECR will be adequate to provide the
data needed in the near term, it is expected that data
on smaller particles and data on the debris popula-
tion in GEO will be needed in the long term. For
these purposes, development could be pursued of an
orbital debris radar which can operate at a shorter
wavelength (perhaps Ku band, 1 cm wavelength),
higher power, and with a larger antenna.
(3) MIT/Lincoln Laboratory Small Object Iden-
tification Lincoln Laboratory suggests the Haystack
long range imaging radar in Massachusetts can be
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used, on an as available basis, to gather the same
type data that a DECR could produce. Lincoln used
the Haystack radar in that mode during early FY 88.
If Haystack operational requirements would al-
low, studies could begin immediately. The Haystack
radar also has the added benefit of being collocated
with the Millstone radar, which could be used si-
multaneously for verification and to perform multi-
sensor experiments.
Use of the Haystack radar- for debris
characterization would compete with other govern-
ment and scientific agencies' needs for the radar.
Lincoln Laboratory estimates that it would take a
total of 4800 hours of radar operation to character-
ize the present debris population, which is far in
excess of available viewing time. Also, the location of
the Haystack radar (42 degrees above the equator) is
not ideal for tracking objects in low inclined orbits.
Haystack's viewing potential for objects in lower
inclined orbits in LEO is limited b y : the increased
range to the object, the relatively short time that a
potential object would be in view, and the increased
signal attenuation and distortion caused by looking
south through the atmosphere.
While tasking for occasional experiments may be
practical, adequate hours may not be available for
necessary debris tasks, given the priority of other
tasks. DoD could be the lead agenc y for Haystack
studies.
(4) Reenteri ng
 Debris Radar (REDRAD) To
determine the rate of elimination of debris from the
environment by drag and subsequent reentry, and to
determine the net effect on the orbital debris bur-
den, an experimental measurement of the total rate
of debris reentry is required to help validate debris
population models. The REDRAD data can be used
to calculate the total reentry rate of debris.
Radars have long been used to detect the ioniza-
tion trails caused by the high speed entry of meteors
into the earth's atmosphere. Reentering debris also
produces ionization trails, which can be detected by
meteor radars. Reentering particles as small as 10
grams (corresponding to about 2 cm diameter) were
detected by a modified meteor radar during the
Delta 180 test. By operating the radar at highest
powers, particles as small as 0.1 cm could be de-
tected.
Distinguishing between trails caused by naturally
occurring meteors and those caused by debris re-
quires measuring their velocity, which is less than 7
kmisec for reentering debris, and always greater than
about 11 km/sec for meteors. high-power version of
REDRAD which incorporates the capability for ve-
locity measurement is cur rently under consideration.
NASA could be the lead agency for this effort.
(5) Other Radars (Foreign and Domestic) The
National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center at Are-
cibo, Puerto Rico, operated by Cornell University
for the National Science Foundation uses an S-band
transmitter for ionospheric heating experiments. This
transmitter could be used to monitor orbital debris,
although the size of debris detected would be limited
by the radar wavelength. NASA is currently conduct-
ing experiments with the Arecibo facility and has
demonstrated that orbital debris can be detected at
sizes on the order of 1 cm or possibly less.
The U.S. Army is planning a ground-based ex-
perimental radar (GBR-X) for construction at the
Kwajalein Missile Range, with completion scheduled
during the 1990s. The primary function of this radar
will be military research and development, but it is
expected that some operational time will be available
for debris monitoring. The location of this radar at
about 9 degrees latitude would make it useful for
measuring debris in low inclination orbits as well as
other higher orbital inclinations.
With the exception of the Soviet Union, no for-
eign country has a major capability for tracking
satellites and orbital debris. However, some individ-
ual radars exist which could provide supplemental
data. These radars could monitor breakups, espe-
cially during the period shortly after the breakup,
when a large number of objects are in close proxim-
ity. Other cooperative projects are possible. The
West German government has indicated interest in
developing orbital debris projects involving their sat-
ellite tracking radar. Japan also has a satellite track-
ing capability that may be of some use. International
cooperation of this kind not only provides useful
data, but also raises international awareness of the
orbital debris problem. NASA, in cooperation with
the State Department, is the current lead in pursuing
cooperative international efforts of this type.
(6) Space-based Debris Radars A space-based
radar to monitor the debris environment could pro-
vide accurate velocity and direction measurements,
and has the potential for detecting small debris sizes
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and has the potential for detecting small debris sizes
on the order of 1 mm within a few kilometers of the
spacecraft. However, radars this sensitive would re-
quire significantly more power to operate than op-
tical systems of comparable sensitivity. As a
consequence, current space power technology would
limit the capability of space-based radars to levels
less than optical sensors. As new radar or power
technologies develop in the future, the achievable
capabilities of a space-based radar may exceed those
of optical systems.
C. Expansion of Existing Capabilities - Optical
Sensors
(1) Ground-based The existing SSN optical
systems are intended for tracking satellites above
5,000 km altitude. However, they are inherently ca-
pable of detecting orbital debris at lower altitudes,
with a limit of about 5 cm at 500 km altitude. The
use of these sensors to provide statistical debris flux
data at altitudes below 5,000 km can be explored.
Incorporating new Charge Coupled Device
(CCD) technology into existing SSN optical systems
could improve the detection and track capability in
GEO. This requires the addition of hardware and
will likely be implemented through current efforts.
This relatively low cost option will add lifetime to
the current systems and provide an increase of about
10 times greater sensitivity, allowing smaller or more
distant objects to be tracked.
NASA has also used a small, inexpensive, porta-
ble, image- intensified 20 cm telescope for looking at
debris from recent breakups that could not be seen
at low latitudes. This system is being upgraded to a
larger aperture (30 cm) and fitted with a CCD
detector to provide a sensitivity equivalent to the
current SSN optical system.
Optical sensors measure the sunlight reflected or
scattered from objects in orbit. In order to interpret
these data in terms of geometric size of debris, the
reflectivity of the object must be known or esti-
mated. A series of measurements of albedo, or re-
flectivity, of debris objects is required in order to
establish statistical data on the means and standard
deviations of debris albedos. These data can be ob-
tained directly from comparison of infrared and op-
tical signatures of an orbiting object, or indirectly
from comparison of radar cross-sections and optical
signatures. The sensors located at the DARPA Maui
Optical Station could be used for this correlation.
DoD could be the lead agency for SSN upgrading
while NASA could be lead agency for improvements
to their 20 cm telescope.
(2) Spaced-based For LEO, a major deficiency
in our capability for orbital debris measurement is
the inability to measure the debris population in the
0.1 cm to 10 cm diameter size range. Space based
measurements have the advantage that they can be
done close to debris particles and without having to
observe through the atmosphere.
Several space-based surveillance studies and pro-
totype developments are underway. Due to similarit-
ies, these systems will be discussed together. DoD
has developed a prototype space based optical system
(Defense Support Program Adjunct). The Jet Pro-
pulsion Laboratory (JPL) has also done a detailed
conceptual design study of a satellite for debris mon-
itoring (OuickSat). NASA has done a detailed fea-
sibility study of combined visible and thermal
infrared optical system (Debris Collision Warning
Sensors) to be operated from the Shuttle Orbiter
bay. This experiment has entered detailed design
phase. Other proposed space-based optical sensors
are taking advantage of rapid advances in sensor
technology.
The spacecraft necessary to carry a space-borne
sensor depends on the mission profile. Options range
from a dedicated space debris satellite to "piggybac-
king" sensors on another satellite, the Shuttle, or
eventually the Space Station Freedom. Conceptual
studies have shown that the dedicated debris satellite
would be more costly to implement than the Shuttle-
based experiment. The Shuttle-based experiment is
capable of characterizing the LEO debris environ-
ment extensively for the date of flight.
Technologically difficult aspects of a dedicated
space debris satellite include providing adequate on-
board data processing, timely downlinking of data
and a constantly changing point of reference. How-
ever, near-term systems riding "piggyback" on other
high priority mission payloads save cost but may not
provide the best orbit selection.
For GEO, a space-based optical sensor could
significantly increase the ability to detect smaller
debris sizes. Lower angular velocities in GEO would
mean that an even simpler system would be required
compared to LEO. In addition, a GEO - based
system would only have to detect debris 10 cm and
larger to provide new data.
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Further studies, led by DoD, including engineer-
ing analyses and device designs, might be initiated.
D. Returned Material Analysis
(1) Returned Spacecraft Surfaces Material re-
trieved from the Solar Max Satellite has been a
major source of new data on the small debris and
meteoroid population for sizes below about 0.01 cm
(100 microns). The small debris in this size range
results from disintegration of painted surfaces on
spacecraft and the firing of solid rocket motors in
space. NASA could be the lead agency for analyzing
the Solar Max materials.
(2) Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF)
This structure was launched into LEO in 1984, and
is scheduled to be recovered in 1989. LDEF repre-
sents a unique and major source of data for small
debris. Based on model estimates, there should be
several hundred impacts of meteoroids and debris
with sizes up to 0.1 cm. A plan exists to examine the
entire LDEF surface for impact craters immediately
upon its return from space, to select significant areas
for further analysis and to assess other space orbital
environmental effects such as ultraviolet irradiation,
atomic oxygen erosion, etc. It is expected that the
LDEF structure will be refurbished, fitted out with
new experiments to form LDEF II, and launched
into orbit again, sometime in the mid or later 1990s.
NASA can be the lead agency for this activity.
(3) Witness Plates Experience gained from the
Solar Max satellite material suggests that plastic wit-
ness plates may be useful, since traces of the impact-
ing objects are better preserved in the softer
material. A program of routine witness plate expo-
sures could be planned for future Shuttle flights.
A problem with witness plate experiments in the
Shuttle bay is that, because Shuttle flights are short
duration, the period of time the plates are exposed
to the space environment is so short that the number
of impacts is relatively small. This problem could be
solved by deploying a large area collector, which
could be unfurled from the orbiter bay, and then at
the end of the mission, furled again. A large sheet of
thin plastic (mylar, for example) would be suitable.
Conceptual studies of the experiment will be re-
quired. See Appendix 2 for private sector recom-
mended experimentation. NASA could be the lead
agency for this activity.
(4) Cosmic Dust Facility The NASA cosmic
dust program routinely collects dust from the strato-
sphere by exposing collector surfaces to the atmo-
sphere using high-altitude aircraft. Chemical and
physical analysis has shown that a major fraction of
the dust is derived from orbital debris which has
reentered the atmosphere. An effort is needed to
determine the amounts and origin of the dust from
reentered debris. From this information, the total
world-wide reentry rate of orbital debris can be
estimated. This rate can provide a check on the
theoretical estimate of the total reentry rate used in
the debris environment forecast models. NASA can
be the lead agency for this activity.
Additionally, the Cosmic Dust Facility is a major
flight experiment planned for the Freedom Station.
It will measure the velocity and direction of dust
particles which impact the test surface. A fraction of
these impacts will result from small orbital debris
particles. Consequently, the facility could provide
continuous detailed information on the small debris
environment over its 25-30 year lifetime. NASA
could be lead agency for this activity.
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Data management limitations significantly affect
the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) capability to
detect and track orbital debris. This in turn affects
our ability to accurately characterize the debris pop-
ulation and to develop options to minimize debris
propagation and to survive the debris environment.
I. CURRENT DATA MANAGEMENT STATUS
The process of keeping track of large objects in
space, conducted by DoD, involves three steps: 1)
collect sensor observations, 2) correlate these ob-
servations to known objects, and 3) update the object
database with the new observation. The database
must be updated daily for all but GEO objects in
order to keep an accurate and usable catalog of
space objects. The correlation process is crucial to
the overall process and commonly causes significant
problems. Because measurement of small objects is
not yet possible, monitoring them will require the
use of a statistical database. Combining the large and
small object databases will have to be accomplished
through the use of a yet to be developed hybrid
database that can accommodate both an empirical
and a statistical database.
II. OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT AND
FURTHER RESEARCH
A. Data Bases
The ongoing acquisition and prototype develop-
ment efforts described below can help create the
rudiments of the data bases required in the future.
(1) SPADOC 4 One potential solution to the
data base management problem is Space Defense
Operations Center (SPADOC), block 4. The addition
of SPADOC 4 would add capability to data base
management and data base size, but not until the
mid 1990s. New computer hardware will allow for
cataloging of 30,000 on-orbit objects --this is about
three times the current capability. SPADOC 4 is not
currently designed to handle the vast volume of
small debris data. This capability could be added.
Because SPADOC 4 is designed to handle dis-
crete objects only, modifications to the current
SPADOC software would be necessary to allow asso-
ciated statistical debris data to be considered.
(2) Smart Catalog A proof-of concept for a
hybrid database, the Smart Catalog, has already be-
gun. Smart Catalog combines the current discrete
catalog data base and a statistical (for small untrac-
kable debris) data base.
Smart Catalog can be done with current technol-
ogy equipment. The proof-of-concept is showing
great promise and the results should be available in
early 1989. Although discrete tracking of all space
objects--of significant size--is an ultimate goal of the
SSN, this capability will not be available for some
time. The Smart Catalog could provide an interim
fix and allow a basic understanding of the total
orbital debris environment. This understanding could
provide a basis for operational decisions, such as
which orbits/altitudes to use or how much shielding
is required. Initially, the output of a Smart Catalog
would only provide statistical information on space
debris. Thus, collision avoidance with orbital debris
could not be accomplished with certainty.
Smart Catalog can be implemented in one of two
ways. First, once the proof-of-concept is complete,
the design specifications for the hybrid data base
could be added to SPADOC 4. The second option
could be to run Smart Catalog software on separate
computers, off-line to the normal SSC computer
system.
Smart Catalog could also be very cost effective.
Data and data update requirements are significantly
less for Smart Catalog than the discrete catalog.
Computer hardware and software requirements are
minimal. Sampling data, whether by a dedicated ra-
dar or by using existing radars, could be relatively
inexpensive when compared to the requirements to
discretely track tens of thousands of objects.
It should be noted that concepts such as the
Smart Catalog have been created without the benefit
of extensive debris data. Research to define further
data base requirements must be conducted using
empirical debris data. A study led by DoD could be
conducted.
B. Data Processing
New and different data collection techniques
which feed a hybrid data base will require that
tremendous amounts of data be moved, stored, and
archived. It will be necessary to explore alternative
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processing methods which can perform high volume
object correlation and manage the statistical data
base. The Uncorrelated Target Processor, or UCTP,
is a DoD and MIT/Lincoln Laboratory prototype
development which could significantly reduce the
growing numbers of uncorrelated targets (UCTs)
that currently bog down the SSN's data management
capability.
However, comprehensive studies have not been
conducted to examine implementation, loading on
communications data lines, actual processing center
requirements (may require an alternatives subordi-
nate center for processing), and command and con-
trol aspects associated with a debris monitoring
capability. DoD could be the lead agency for ex-
ploration of this option.
C. Modeling
There is a need to characterize the orbital debris
environment, even when observations are not prac-
tical, such as when the size or altitude of objects
makes measurements difficult. Modeling, then, is re-
quired to combine existing measurements and theory
in such a way that predictions can be made. Several
types of models are required to make these predic-
tions:
(a) A model to describe future launches, the
amount of debris resulting from these launches, and
the frequency of accidental or intentional explosions
in orbit (traffic model),
(b) A model to describe the fragment size and
velocity distribution which results from a satellite
explosion or collision (breakup model),
(c) A model which will make long-term predic-
tions of how debris orbits will change with time
(propagation model), and
(d) A model which predicts collision probabilities
for spacecraft (flux or risk model).
Many of these models exist; however, most were
formulated to handle a relatively few orbiting objects
for a short time and for a specific application. Con-
sequently, cur rent computer resou rces (hardware and
software) are inadequate to handle the large number
of objects associated with orbital debris, the long-
term predictions required, and the variety of applica-
tions for which the models must be used.
Modeling being conducted at NASA has reduced
the computational requirements considerably; how-
ever, greater improvements are required in event
(breakup) models and environmental (propagation)
models for both LEO and GEO modeling could be a
joint NASA/DoD effort.
D. Validation and Analysis
Models of an environment or a process must be
tested empirically for accuracy and predictability. If
the output of the models does not match the real
world, or if the predictions produced by the models
are not repeatable each time the model is run, the
model is not valid and it must be reformulated. To
validate the models, then, test scenarios must be
developed to allow empirical data to be compared to
model results. The tests normally involve collecting a
limited set of data, where possible, and comparing
the data set to the model results, having run the
model under the same conditions as the collected
data. These tests not only validate models but also
serve to refine the models for increased accuracy.
This validation method certainly applies to debris
models. Since several organizations have on-going
debris modeling efforts, models and model predic-
tions should be archived for later use as test data for
future debris modeling efforts. NASA and DoD
could jointly lead these tasks.
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I. CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND RESEARCH
A. Design Philosophy
Although current hardware and ongoing activities
have occasionally been modified for debris preven-
tion, the design of many future systems now include
debris-prevention objectives from the start. A good
example of this is the design of the Space Station
Freedom. Studies are looking at the proper method
of disposal of used materials from the Station. One
design option may be deorbiting used and waste
material using a tether, rather than using the Shuttle.
The objectives behind these studies are not only to
prevent the creation of orbital debris, but also to
protect the Freedom Station itself and to avoid con-
tamination of the surrounding environment, thus in-
hibiting the scientific work on the station.
B. Operational Procedures
Some operational procedures have already been
adopted by various agencies to minimize debris gen-
eration. These procedures have occurred on an ad-
hoc basis to date, but even this limited number of
actions have already had an impact on the debris
environment.
The first area in which debris-mitigation proce-
dures have been incorporated is in mission oper-
ations, both for launch vehicles and for payloads.
The previously-mentioned Delta upper stage modi-
fications are a good example of this. The rate of
increase of orbital debris from U.S. sources has
dropped 15% because of this action alone. The dis-
posal of spent rocket stages during flight has also
been examined and in some cases altered for debris
considerations. Launch planning is also affected by
projections of the Collision Avoidance on Launch
(COLA) program which warns of potential collisions
or near misses for manned or man-capable vehicles
before they are launched. Some launches have been
momentarily delayed during their countdowns to
avoid flying in close proximity of orbiting objects.
However, it should be noted that sensor limitations
affect the accuracy of any predictions. In addition,
the Computation of Miss Between Orbits (COMBO)
program projects proximity of payloads to debris
objects soon after launch, and has been used on
launches of manned missions.
Procedures affecting payloads include the use of
the "disposal orbit" for satellites at the end of their
functional lives. DoD, NOAH, INTELSAT, ESA and
others have boosted aging satellites to altitudes above
geosynchronous orbits, attempting to reduce the
probabilities of debris-producing collisions in GEO
and freeing up valuable GEO orbital slots. EVA
(Extravehicular Activities) procedures will also be
examined, and tighter control of tools and equip-
ment during construction and operations will be nec-
essary.
The second area in which debris-mitigating
procedures have been adopted is in testing in space,
primarily military-related testing necessary for out-
national defense. This testing is principally accom-
plished by means of mathematical modeling, but
frequently must be performed in space prior to de-
velopment decisions. Experience from DoD space
experiments involving the creation of orbital debris
has proved that we can minimize the accumulation
of debris by careful planning. The Delta 180 SDI
test was planned in such a way that nearly all of the
debris generated by these tests re-entered within six
months. This is because the test was conducted at
low altitude to enhance orbital decay of the debris.
Predictions of the amount of debris and its or-
bital characteristics were made to assess range safety,
debris orbit lifetimes, and potential interference with
other space programs. The post-mission debris cloud
was observed to verify predictions and to improve
the break-up models. Such debris-minimizing test
operations will now become standard procedure,
consistent with test requirements. Another aspect of
test debris-prevention is the use of debris-minimizing
targets. An example is the development of a large
instrumented balloon, rather than a solid structure,
which can measure various aspects of an impact,
without creating many thousands of small debris
objects.
II. OPTION'S FOR IMPROVEMENT AND FUTURE
RESEARCH
There are options available to control, limit, or
reduce the growth of orbital debris. However, none
of them can significantly modify the current debris
environment; they can only influence the future en-
vironment. The three generic options of debris con-
trol are:
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• Mitigating options, such as booster and
payload design, preventing spontaneous ex-
plosions of rocket bodies and spacecraft, and
"particle free" propellant research;
• Disposal or elimination of orbital debris ob-
jects; and
• Active removal or "cleaning" activities.
A. Mitigation
Launch vehicles and spacecraft often are de-
signed so that they are "litter-free"; i.e., they dispose
of separation devices, payload shrouds, and other
expendable hardware (other than upper stage rocket
bodies) at low enough altitude and velocity that they
do not become orbital. This is more difficult to do
when two spacecraft share a common launch vehicle.
In addition, stage-to-stage separation devices and
spacecraft protective devices such as lens covers and
other potential debris can be kept captive to the
stage or spacecraft with lanyards or other provisions
to minimize debris, which is being done in some
cases. These practices could be continued and ex-
panded when possible.
The task of "litter free" operations could com-
bine design and operational practices to achieve the
goal of limiting further orbital debris created by any
space operations. As a result of these efforts, the
growth rate of orbital debris will decline, although
the overall debris population will still increase.
When stages and spacecraft do not have the
capability to deorbit, they need to be made as inert
as feasible. Expelling all propellants and pressurants
and assuring that batteries are protected from spon-
taneous explosion require modifications in either de-
sign or operational practices for both stages and
spacecraft. For systems that have multi-burn (restart)
capability, there are generally few, if any, design
modifications required. For systems that do not have
multi-burn capability, design modifications to expel
propellants are more extensive. Detailed studies are
required for implementation of these procedures in
current systems (The Delta launch vehicle already
includes such procedures).
Research could be conducted to develop "particle
free" propellants. If successful, this technology re-
search effort could eliminate the aluminum oxide
particulates produced by current solid rocket motor
propellants which add considerably to the small de-
bris population. Such a program already exists for
tactical missile propellant but there is no work cur-
rently being performed for space applications. A
feasibility/demonstration program could be initiated
to carry this out. The lead agency for this research
effort could be DoD with NASA support.
B. Disposal
Disposal or deorbiting of spent upper stages or
spacecraft is a more aggressive and effective strategy
than merely inerting spent stages and spacecraft,
since it removes from the environment significant
mass that could become future debris.
For new spacecraft and launch systems, there is a
large number of tradeoffs as to the physical and
functional interface between the stage and spacecraft
which can minimize the adverse effect of implement-
ing a disposal requirement. Studies are required to
assess the cost effectiveness of these tradeoffs, given
a particular system and mission. DoD, NASA, and
the private sector must each do these studies.
For near term concerns, the highest priority for
disposal must be given to high-use altitudes. How-
ever, disposal of debris at these altitudes is most
costly and difficult.
There are two types of approaches that might be
explored: mission design and system configuration
and operations. Each needs to be applied to both
LEO and GEO systems. Studies are required to
assess the cost effectiveness of these options given a
particular system and mission. DoD and NASA
could lead these efforts and could solicit private
sector involvement.
(1) Mission Design Some debris can be disposed
of by careful mission design, but this may sometimes
result in a significant performance penalty to both
spacecraft and launch systems.
For some missions, the performance of the
launch vehicle has sufficient margin that the stage
has propellant available to do a deorbit burn. The
stage needs to be modified to provide the mission
life and guidance and control capabilities needed to
do a controlled deorbit. Studies are necessary to
define the mission duration needed and the proce-
dures to be followed to control the stage disposal.
When the mission requires delivery of a
spacecraft which itself has a maneuver capability,
two alternatives are possible. One is to leave the
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upper stage attached for deliver\ of the spacecraft to
orbit to maximize its maneuver capability. The sec-
ond is to separate the spacecraft at suborbital ve-
locity so that the stage decays naturally, and the
spacecraft uses its onboard propulsion to establish its
orbit. From a cost-penalty perspective, alternative
one results in a greater mass in orbit, a potential
debris hazard, while alternative two increases the
complexity of the spacecraft. Assessing which alter-
native is more appropriate requires further study.
An alternative to entry and ocean disposal is
relocation to a "trash" orbit. In LEO, this is gen-
erally not an advantageous strategy because it gen-
erally requires a two-burn maneuver that is more
fuel costly than the single burn for entry . In any
case, it is not certain that any LEO orbit should be
used for "mash". However, "trash" orbits in LEO
are used for nuclear payloads due to reentry envi-
ronmental and safety considerations. S ystematic stud-
ies to determine what is the most cost-effective
course of action, and what considerations dictate the
optimization criteria for a particular project are re-
quired.
For GEO missions, the pertinent considerations
for disposal are the launch date and azimuth and the
perigee of the transfer stage. For multiburn systems,
positive ocean disposal can be achieved with an apo-
gee burn of a few meters/second if the stage has
sufficient battery lifetime and contains an attitude
reference and control system.
In addition, there is a set of launch times to
GEO which so align the orbit of the transfer stage
that natural forces, e.g., Sun, moon, earth properties
etc., act to lower or raise the perigee of the stage.
Consideration of the effect of these forces can mini-
mize the cost of active control of liquid propellant
stages and is a low cost technique for the disposal of
solid rocket motor stages. The only alternative strat-
egy for the disposal of solid rocket motors is to
orient the thrust vector of the rocket in a direction
so that the perigee of the transfer orbit resulting
from the burn is at a low enough altitude to cause
the stage eventually to reenter (sometimes referred
to as an "off-axis burn"). This strategy results in
about a 15% performance penalty for the stage. As
is the case for the LEO stages, comprehensive stud-
ies are needed to determine the details of the proce-
dures required and which approach is most cost
effective for any given project.
Use of "disposal" orbits is a technically feasible
strategy for clearing the geostationary orbit region
but is not the only available strategy. The cost-
effectiveness of a disposal orbit strategy compared
with other strategies has not been examined. If rais-
ing the orbit is to be the technique of choice, then it
requires planning and reserving the necessary propel-
lant resources to effect the maneuver. Preliminary
studies indicate that the orbit needs to be raised on
the order of 200 krn to serve the intended purpose,
not the 40 - 70 km that has been used by some
operators. The necessary propellant for this maneu-
ver might be equivalent to a year's station-keeping
capability and a potential loss of revenue, for exam-
ple, estimated to be in excess of $20 million for an
INTELSAT VI spacecraft.
Finally, beyond 25,000 km, it is less costly to go
to an escape trajectory from earth orbit, rather than
deorbiting, because the fuel required to reenter from
a circular- orbit is a function of altitude.
(2) Syste m_ Configuration and Opera t ions Stud-
ies Mission design appears to be the least cost
option for disposal. However, systems not designed
with a disposal requirement have other alternatives
available, such as design modifications to current
systems or design attributes for new systems.
For LEO stages or spacecraft, it may be feasible
to maneuver to lower the perigee and employ some
device to significantly increase drag. A drag device,
such as a large balloon inflated by a subliming agent,
could have a lower overall performance penalty in
both mass and complexity than using only spacecraft
propulsion for disposal.
In geosynchronous transfer stages, the design and
operation timeline could be modified so that the
separation and avoidance maneuver could provide
the velocity increment to cause the stage to enter.
Drag devices may also increase accuracy of the pre-
dictions of atmosphere entry points.
In the mission design studies noted above, pre-
liminary surveys of the concepts have been
conducted. However, systematic studies and cost ef-
fectiveness assessments are also required. DoD and
NASA could be the lead agencies for these studies.
C. Removal
Removal is the elimination of space objects by
another system. At present there is no capability nor
perceived need for removal at GEO, so this discus-
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sion pertains only to LEO. Removal options may
also raise significant international legal issues, which
are discussed in Chapter 9, Legal Issues.
(1). Large Objects The removal of large, inert
objects requires an active maneuver vehicle with the
capability to rendezvous with and grapple an inert,
tumbling and non-cooperative target; and the ability
to properly and accurately apply the required ve-
locity increment to move the object to a desired
orbit. These capabilities have been demonstrated by
the Space Shuttle, but no unmanned system has
these capabilities for higher altitudes and inclina-
tions. There have been a few conceptual studies;
however, detailed design and operations analyses,
development, and demonstrations could be conduct-
ed. See Appendix 2 for private sector related propos-
als. NASA could lead this effort.
The design, development and operation of a
maneuverable stage to remove other stages and
spacecraft requires a high degree of automation in
the rendezvous, grapple, and entry burn manage-
ment if cost of operations are to be kept reasonable.
The long and short range systems to acquire, assess
the orientation, grapple, secure, determine the center
of mass, and plan the duration and timing of the
entry burn all require development and demonstra-
tion. The component technologies require study and
analysis, followed by breadboard and prototype de-
velopment. With some preliminary efforts already
underway, NASA could assume lead agency respon-
sibilities.
(2) Small Objects The multiplicity of small
objects makes it impossible to actively acquire and
enter each object individually. There are two classes
of schemes that have been proposed for the removal
of such debris. One is the use of active or passive
devices to intercept particles with a medium, such as
a large foam balloon, which absorbs kinetic energy
from the particles. This causes the objects' perigee to
fall to regions where aerodynamic drag induces en-
try. The other is an active device which illuminates
the particle with a beam of directed energy, causing
the particle either to lose velocity or to be dissipated
into fragments that are no longer of significant mass.
See Appendix 2 for private sector proposals.
Since the intercept balloon does not discriminate
between debris and functioning spacecraft, it could
inflict damage on usable assets. Avoidance of such
damage might require active maneuvers by the inter-
cept balloon. The advantages of a simple system
could be lost if the system's operation becomes too
complicated.
The active directed energy system requires ele-
ments that do not yet exist. This system requires
high energy output, high precision pointing, and
instruments for debris object detection and beam
aiming so the intercept can be accomplished, without
accidentally harming other operational spacecraft.
Studies are required to determine which is the
preferable system to implement. The development of-
the detection and aiming instruments have a great
deal in common with similar detectors required for
the environmental monitoring task described above
and the collision avoidance task described below.
These activities could be led by NASA and DoD.
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I. CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND RESEARCH
The need for protection from orbital debris is
influencing the design of new spacecraft. In the past,
spacecraft design took into account the natural me-
teoroid environment. However, all future spacecraft
will also have to consider man-made debris hazards
during design. The Space Station Freedom is only
the first to do so.
Missions can also be planned from the outset to
avoid debris-threatening situations. For example,
congested orbital inclinations or altitudes could be
avoided, consistent with mission objectives. This al-
ready takes place in interplanetary missions in which
hazards from the natu r ally occurring asteroid belt
are avoided. Proper treatment of disposable compo-
nents can also be part of mission planning. For
example, NOAA has begun requiring that some of
the hardware involved in upper stage separation be
kept attached to the upper stage rather than float
away as separate debris objects.
II. OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT AND
FUTURE RESEARCH
A. Mission Design
Spacecraft and launch systems can he designed
and operated in ways that reduce their vulnerability
to the debris environment. The acceptability of any
given vulnerability reducing strategy is a function of
the mission objective of the space system. Mission
design is an option for using current systems in
alternative ways. Orbit selection to avoid regions of
high probability of debris collision is feasible for
some spacecraft missions but not practical for others
without significant mission-objective compromise.
For example, the same observations made from dif-
ferent orbits might require different instruments of
varying cost and complexity. DoD, NASA, and pri-
vate companies each need to assess the cost of such
a strategy.
B. System Protection
Spacecraft can be protected from serious damage
by using shielding or by designing the spacecraft to
be damage-tolerant (i.e., redundant systems and criti-
cal sub-systems separation to prevent single event
catastrophes). The most straight-forward approach is
shielding. Although shielding against micro-meteor-
ites has always been a consideration, the existing and
anticipated levels of threat from orbital debris makes
shielding more important. In addition, much of the
man-made debris falls into larger size categories than
naturally occurring debris. This somewhat larger de-
bris, in the millimeter (0.1 cm) to centimeter range,
potentially calls for different types of shielding than
have been used in the past. The method of shielding
to be used can significantly affect the design of
spacecraft, in configuration, performance, and cost,
and must be part of the design philosophy from the
outset.
Shielding can be an integral part of the
spacecraft, such as a protective outer shell, or can be
used as a movable shield. See Appendix 2 for private
sector proposal. In most cases, integral shielding
could be used to protect against smaller debris,
which would be damaging but not destructive. A
more robust shield could be used for less frequent
but more destructive debris or to provide local tem-
porary shielding, such as for astronauts during EVA
or to protect a sensitive payload. The threshold be-
tween damaging and destructive impacts would be
mission dependent.
Designs for survivability of the spacecraft if and
when an anticipated collision occurs are becoming
more explicit. One option is a system of active
louvers or shutters that could be maneuvered to
protect delicate equipment in the event of a colli-
sion. A similar idea utilizes a "turtle shell" spacecraft
concept. This type of spacecraft could consist of a
main protective structu r e with ports through which
sensors and arrays could be deployed and later with-
drawn into the protective structure in the event of
an anticipated collision. Shielding of sensitive ele-
ments of a satellite, such as mirrors and lenses, when
not in use is a semi-active technique that is effective
against small to medium debris and is currently used
in the MIR space station.
A form of shielding is based on a principle devel-
oped by the astronomer Fred Whipple involving
multi-wall fabrication in which the exterior- wall
serves as a sacrificial barrier. This breaks up impact-
ing debris and disperses approximately 80% of the
fragmented debris over a larger area on the interior
wall. The remaining 20% is deflected away from the
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shield, but is too small to constitute a hazard. This is
the baseline shielding approach being studied to pro-
tect the Freedom Station modules.
Some far-term research proposals offer a high-
payoff potential. There are five distinct areas for
shielding research. Both DoD and NASA have on-
going programs which are mutually beneficial. Both
programs deserve continued support and increased
cross-fertilization.
(1) Hypervelocity impact testing and facilities
Proposed research includes development of a larger,
more durable gun facility with the capability of fir-
ing 2-cm projectiles weighing 10-15 grams at speeds
up to 12 km/sec. Test methods might also be devel-
oped for qualifying new materials and shielding con-
cepts as well as validating hypervelocity impact
anal ysis methods. DoD has conducted research in
this area, and close coordination between NASA and
DoD should be continued.
(2) Modeling impact effects Research is recom-
mended to develop advanced methods for accurately
and efficiently predicting the response of materials
and structures to impact, including internal shock
wave propagation; material phase change and rejec-
tion: and deformation and penetration. Particular
attention could be directed to non-homogeneous ma-
terials, such as composites, and to modeling methods
more advanced than classical hydrodynamic ap-
proaches. Also, modeling effects on complete
spacecraft, in addition to discrete sections, needs
development.
(3) Materials research and development This
activity could concentrate on advanced lightweight
materials system including fiber and particulate com-
posites and layered materials. Materials could also be
examined which would pulverize upon impact rather
than fragment, creating less hazardous debris.
(4) Shielding concepts This research area could
develop structural shielding concepts for both fixed,
integral shielding and movable shields. The emphasis
could be placed on light weight, low cost and the
capture of collision products. A major goal might be
to develop effective shielding concepts for debris up
to 2-cm in size (approx. 10-15 grams) with speeds up
to 12 km/sec.
(5) Validation and certification This research
area could involve all four previous areas and de-
velop analytical and test methods for qualifying the
survivability of entire spacecraft.
Closely related to survivability is the concept of
redundancy. This concept has historically been used
to compensate for possible electronic component
failure. However, it has definite benefits in the event
of a minor collision with debris which might damage
one or more inst r uments or components onboard the
spacecraft. With redundant systems physically sepa-
rated on the spacecraft, it may be able to continue
functioning.
The ultimate objective of the above research pro-
jects could be to develop methods to configure a
spacecraft to minimize the damage from debris im-
pact. This will involve assessing the response of a
spacecraft to a penetrating impact and to predict the
extent of internal damage. Automated design meth-
ods could then be developed to trade off the benefits
from shielding, configuration and redundancy in an
optimal manner based on mission costs and require-
ments.
Protecting a satellite from debris requires signifi-
cant investment by the owner/operator. The best
current protection is shielding. There will be devel-
opment costs to create increased shielding. For pas-
sive shielding, the weight will translate to added
dollars and less payload. If the shielding is active
(can move into place as necessary), there are com-
mand and control issues and added complexity,
though weight can probably be saved.
C. Collision Avoidance
The concept of active collision avoidance is in a
very early stage of definition, and studies of all the
concepts in this section are needed to define their
feasibility. It should be noted that there are ex-
tremely difficult problems (cost, weight, technology)
associated with active collision avoidance methods.
Active collision avoidance of all space objects is
not currently practiced, nor is it likely to become
feasible in the near-term. However, there are specific
cases and orbits where collision avoidance is prac-
ticed to a limited extent. Utilization of COLA and
COMBO programs was discussed earlier. In addition,
collision avoidance in the geosynchronous region has
been practiced on a routine basis by DoD since
1982.
The major deficiency with all of these activities is
the error in the tracking accu racy. Current tracking
accuracy is not sufficient to permit a collision avoid-
ance maneuver to be made. Often it is just as likely
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to maneuver into the path of an oncoming object as
away from it due to the tracking inaccuracies. In the
geosynchronous orbit, if close approaches repeatedly
occur, one satellite may be maneuvered. For one
time close approaches, usually no maneuver is per-
formed.
The maneuvering of a satellite to avoid a colli-
sion obviously requires the provision of a maneuver
capability on the satellite, with associated mass and
cost penalties. Studies are needed to understand the
tradeoffs involved in implementing this capability.
For example, rapid maneuvers require significant
propulsion capability and fuel. Precise prediction and
timely notice allow smaller, less costly maneuvers.
While some measure of collision avoidance is fea-
sible, it is very costly and, for most systems, not
practical.
In addition, the threatened satellite must receive
warning of a potential collision. Currently, the warn-
ing can only be provided by the existing Space
Surveillance Network (SSN). There are several limi-
tations to the existing SSN for collision avoidance.
The first is lack of accuracy, which is currently
inadequate to support collision avoidance maneuvers.
A second important SSN issue is sensitivity. As stat-
ed earlier in this report, the minimum size object
that can be reliably detected in LEO is about 10 cm
in diameter, yet avoidance of particles of 1 cm
diameter is desirable. This could require an increase
in sensitivity of a factor of 100, requiring a major
redesign of most sensors. The increased sensitivity
could result in a large increase in the number of
objects maintained in the catalog, resulting in a cor-
responding increase in required computational re-
sources needed.
On-board detection and computation can sense
and respond to debris too small to be tracked from
ground facilities but its effectiveness is limited by
constraints on the on-board sensors' field of view.
This means that it can see threats several revolutions
ahead in plane but may have only seconds to react
to out of plane threats. On-board computation needs
would be significant both in technological capabil-
ities and payload tradeoffs.
An onboard radar intended to detect the debris
in all directions around the spacecraft would require
excessive power. Consequently, a space-based radar
intended primarily to monitor the total environment
around the spacecraft does not appear promising.
For a longer-term solution, it may be desirable to
develop an autonomous collision avoidance sensor,
possibly a combination of a wide-angle infra-red
telescope and a narrow beam radar, to be carried on
very large satellites.
Another method to remove debris threat may be
to pulverize the debris. For any method of removing
the threat to be effective, the debris must be pulver-
ized into pieces less than 0.01 cm. diameter and/or
have all relative velocity removed.
A final possibility is repulsion of the encroaching
debris by some force field. This may indeed be
possible for small debris, which often acquires a
significant charge; but the power requirements for
such a system would probably be prohibitive. For
medium to large debris there is no known repulsive
force that would be effective.
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I. APPROACHES TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS
The United States cannot address the debris issue
alone without the cooperation of other governments.
Several other nations and organizations (ESA, Ar-
ianespace, INTELSAT, INMARSAT) have contribut-
ed to the debris environment through their space
activities. The Soviet Union has become the largest
generator of new space debris, and the most signifi-
cant recent debris incident was the explosion of an
Ariane upper stage. Responsibility for space debris
also extends to all nations and organizations that
operate launchers and satellites, and includes "the
customers" of activities conducted in space -- such as
telecommunications. Clearly, at some point, we will
need to approach foreign governments and organiza-
tions to seek their cooperation. The substance, tim-
ing, modalities, and venue of such an approach will
have to take into account other findings of this
study.
Informal discussions of various aspects of the
orbital debris issue have already taken place among
space agency scientists, engineers and managers.
These discussions have occurred at technical society
meetings and in occasional agency-level meetings.
NASA and ESA have held technical discussions
about the redesign of Ariane third stages, which
were exploding in orbit similar to NASA's earlier
experience with the Delta upper stages. ESA has
since redesigned the third stage to vent propellants
and pressurants to prevent those explosions. The
first launch of the fully modified third stage is
scheduled to take place in May 1989.
Similar exchanges on upper stage design and ex-
perience have taken place between NASA engineers
and their counterparts at the Japanese space oper-
ations agency, NASDA. Subsequently, the upper
stage of the H-I launch vehicle has been modified.
Chinese space personnel have also made inquiries to
NASA personnel about debris matters, as have So-
viet scientists.
ESA has established an Orbital Debris Working
Group to produce a study of the current debris
environment and to make recommendations about
how ESA should deal with the issue. This Working
Group has recommended that ESA create an orbital
Debris Investigation Program, complete with appro-
priate funding and staff. Among other recommenda-
tions is a proposal to coordinate all debris activities
and research in Europe through the ESA program.
ESA's Director General is expected to act on these
recommendations in the near future.
Annual coordination meetings between the
NASA Orbital Debris Steering Group and the ESA
Working Group have taken place since 1987. The
meetings have focused on discussions of ongoing
activities, of research and modeling, and of potential
areas of technical cooperation. A recent fallout from
these discussions has been the development of an
arrangement to share debris tracking data. Other
potential cooperative activities include modeling ac-
tivities and hypervelocity testing.
Several foreign governments and international or-
ganizations have taken steps to address the
disposition of geosynchronous satellites at the end of
life. INTELSAT, Telesat (Canada), INMARSAT,
Eutelsat, and ISRO (India) have all adopted policies
requiring their future satellites to have orbit-raising
capabilities at the end of life. INTELSAT and
Telesat have already boosted satellites out of GEO.
Other countries, such as the Soviet Union, Japan,
and Italy, although they have not announced formal
policies, have also boosted satellites. However, it is
not clear that these actions have been sufficient to
avoid increasing the debris accumulation in GEO.
II. TACTICAL CONSIDERATION'S
In possible future approaches to other Govern-
ments, one of our goals will be to ensure that the
United States' commercial space industry is not sig-
nificantly disadvantaged by taking policy, regulatory,
or technical steps that are not followed by our com-
petitors. We also do not want to constrain dispropor-
tionately our civil or military space programs, or
drive our launch or satellite industries offshore to
escape U.S. regulations. Consistency of policies, stan-
dards, and practices among nations active in space is
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obviously the ultimate objective. On the other hand,
we cannot wait for a solution agreed to by most or
all of the players before we act.
In examining options for an approach, we will
need to address its scope, its level, its timing, and its
content. Options for the scope of the approach
include: bilateral - space powers only; bilateral - all
nations; multilateral - space powers only; multilateral
- all nations.
In the longer term, additional nations will be-
come launching and satellite operating states. In ad-
dition to nations such as India and Brazil which
already are developing launch vehicles and satellites,
there are several threshold countries attempting to
build their own launch vehicles, such as Pakistan and
Argentina. In addition, there are nations that intend
to build or purchase satellites which would be laun-
ched on the vehicles of others. As satellites also can
become debris or contribute to it, the cooperation of
manufacturing, purchasing, and operating states will
be necessary.
As for bilateral versus multilateral approaches,
bilateral approaches would be more manageable; the
only existing multilateral body which deals with gen-
eral space issues at the government level is the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
where legal and technical issues have become heavily
politicized. ESA is a multilateral body but they con-
duct a unified spacecraft and launch program and
can be dealt with on a bilateral basis. Attempts have
been made in the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) to regulate debris generation in GEO
but the issue is still under study.
As for the level of our approaches, both govern-
ment level and agency level approaches are neces-
sary. Initial agency-to-agency approaches are useful
for the exchange of information, and for exchanges
of views on technical options and impacts on specific
programs. However, discussions that involve poten-
tially sensitive national security-related information
will require DoD participation. Additionally, when-
ever the intent of discussions is to lead eventually to
formal policy agreement, or whenever a previously
technical discussion tur ns toward such an intent, the
discussions should be conducted by a U.S. inter-
agency team (including NASA, DoD, State, DOT,
DOC, and other agencies as appropriate). Govern-
ment-to-government approaches will be necessary to
convey our level of concern at the political level and
to establish a political context for the discussion of
the issue. It will be important for all of these ap-
proaches to be coordinated.
The timing of our approaches will be affected
both by our own state of progress on the debris issue
and by external events, such as a major debris in-
cident or the raising of the issue in a multilateral
body. Clearly, internal U.S. government agreement is
essential on at least the general substance of U.S.
policy on the issue before we make broad policy
proposals to other governments. However, there
could be phases in the timing of our approaches. For
example, we may be able to begin exchanging in-
formation about space debris with other govern-
ments early in the process.
From a foreign policy point of view, simply
informing other governments of our own declared
policy and the interagency study can only serve as a
first step. We must also offer to begin a dialogue in
which information about space debris would be ex-
changed. Next steps could be to seek agreement with
our broad policy statement, and to seek agreement
on specific proposals for technical and regulatory
measures. At that stage, we will want to seek the
agreement of foreign governments to our approach
to private sector operators, so that the U.S. private
sector is not disadvantaged in relation to its foreign
competitors.
In addition to technical and operational consider-
ations, an important question is the role of interna-
tional space law and regulation. Some aspects of
international law, particularly liability, have implica-
tions for space debris. An issue to consider is wheth-
er we want to expand upon existing multilateral
agreements, pursue a separate additional agreement
on space debris, or simply seek the harmonization of
laws, regulations, and practices by space powers and
organizations operating space systems.
I11. INSTRUCTIONS TO DELEGATES
The space debris issue has been raised by other
nations in meetings of the United Nations Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS), the U.N. Conference on Disarmament,
the International Telecommunications Satellite Or-
ganization, and constituent bodies of the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union. In the latter case,
a specific proposal for the removal of satellites from
the geosynchronous orbit is under review. On July
15, the U.N. Secretariat asked the U.S. to provide
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information on space debris by December 26, in the 	 INTELSAT and INMARSAT operate satellite sys-
context of a working group on nuclear power 	 tems and are users of launch services whose oper-
sources in space.
	
	
ations and whose members could be affected by
national debris policies.
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I. THE MEANING OF "SPACE DEBRIS"
"Space debris" is a popular rather than legal
term. As such, it does not have a precise definition.
The popular term is commonly used to indicate
components or fragments of space objects that are
spent or no longer functional. Space debris usually
refers only to tangible, physical objects that are man-
made (and not, for example, meteorites). Legal
sources that are potentially relevant to space debris
do not use the term "space debris". Rather, they use
terms such as "harmful interference" or "component
parts of a space object". Thus, legal terms must be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine wheth-
er they could include the popular notion of "space
debris".
II. APPLICABLE DOMESTIC LAW
There are two kinds of domestic law that are
potentiall y applicable to space debris, regulatory law
concerning standards that must be met before launch
and tort law relating to damage that occurs as a
result of space debris.
With respect to regulatory law, U.S. governmen-
tal space activities (both civil and military) do not
appear to be governed by explicit legal standards
regarding space debris. Several U.S.Government
agencies consider that, as a legal matter, the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires
an environmental assessment for certain federal ac-
tions that may affect the environment with the Unit-
ed States, and E.O. 12114 for certain federal actions
that may affect the environment of the "global com-
mons outside the jurisdiction of any nation (e.g., the
oceans or Antarctica)", do not apply to space. These
agencies have therefore concluded that an environ-
mental assessment of the potential generation of
space debris on orbit is not required. Some agencies
have nevertheless conducted such an assessment as a
policy matter.
Regarding private commercial launches, the
Commercial Space Launch Act gives authority to the
Department of Transportation to prescribe such re-
quirements, with respect to launches and the opera-
tion of launch sites, "as are necessary to protect the
public health and safety, safety of property, and
national security interests and foreign policy interests
of the United States" (49 U.S.C. 2607(b)). Although
the Secretary of DOT has not used this authority to
issue regulations setting forth standards for the mini-
mization of space debris by the commercial launch
industry, this provision could be so invoked.
With respect to remote sensing from satellites,
the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of
1984 provides that a licensee shall "upon termination
of operations under the license, make disposition of
any satellites in space in a manner satisfactory to the
President" (section 402(b)(3)). This provision would
appear to permit the Department of Commerce to
require that a spent spacecraft not be left in a
position that contributes to the proliferation of space
debris. Presumably, design and orbital conditions
could be imposed to promote the desired disposition.
With respect to the second kind of applicable
law, it is possible that U.S. tort law could potentially
be applied in the case of damage caused by space
debris in the United States. (A suit against the Unit-
ed States, as opposed to a private entity, would have
to be in accordance with the Federal Tort Claims
Act.) U.S. courts might also establish jurisdiction
where negligence or a wrongful act in the United
States resulted in damage caused by debris in space
or elsewhere outside the United States. Thus, even
absent federal regulation, the development of a body
of common law related to damage caused by space
debris could lead to the existence of standards re-
garding the minimization of such debris.
III. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW
There are several international agreements poten-
tially bearing on space debris. The Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which entered
into force on October 10, 1967, contains principles
which, although general, would appear relevant to
any discussion of space debris. First, the Treaty
provides that parties bear responsibility for "national
activities" in space and that non-governmental activi-
ties require authorization and continuing supervision
(see Article VI). This provision makes clear that a
party must have some kind of approval/monitoring
process for private space activities and that, although
the scope of "national activities" is unclear, a party
could be responsible for at least certain of its
nationals' activities in space.
43
CHAPTER 9: LEGAL ISSUES
Second, the Treaty provides that parties are
obliged to conduct all their outer space activities
with due regard to the corresponding interests of
other parties (see Article IX). Although parties are
called upon to avoid adverse changes in the environ-
ment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of
"extraterrestrial matter", it is unlikely that this clause
was intended to cover matter originating on Earth.)
In addition, a party is obligated to consult if an
activity planned by it or its nationals would cause
"potentially harmful interference" with activities of
other parties in the exploration and use of outer
space. It would appear that the generation of space
debris could, depending on the circumstances, be
viewed as falling within the scope of this provision.
Third, the Treaty provides that each party that
launches or procures the launch of a space object, as
well as each party from whose territory an object is
launched, is internationally liable for damage to an-
other party (or its natural/juridical persons) by such
object (or its component parts) on the Earth, in air
space, or in outer space. This principle is further
elaborated in the Liability Convention, as discussed
below.
Fourth, the Treaty provides that the party on
whose registry a space object is launched into outer
space retains jurisdiction and control over such ob-
ject while it is in outer space (Article VIII). The
ownership of a space object and its component parts
is not affected by their presence in outer space or
their return to Earth. These principles are relevant
to the issue of destruction or removal of non-U.S.
debris, as discussed below.
The treaty that is perhaps most relevant to a
discussion of space debris is the Convention on In-
ternational Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, which entered into force on September 1,
1972. The Convention imposes upon a launching
State absolute liability for damage caused by its
space object on the Earth or to aircraft in flight; in
the case of damage other than on the Earth to a
space object by the space object of another State, the
latter is liable if the damage is due to its fault or the
fault of persons for whom it is responsible. A "space
object" is defined to include "component parts of a
space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts
thereof"; there is no requirement that such parts be
functional. Thus, as space debris, and a launching
state's potential liability under the Convention would
continue despite the non-functional nature of its
space object.
The present state of space technology does not
permit activities in space that are completely debris-
free. The question therefore arises whether it would
be necessary, in order to establish "fault" for damage
caused by debris in space, to demonstrate more than
the mere production of debris as a consequence of
legitimate space operations. It would appear that
other factors such as the proximity of other space
objects, the reason for the creation of the debris, and
the probability of causing interference with the space
activities of other nations must be considered when
establishing "fault".
Under the Convention, joint launching states are
jointly and severally liable for damage; as between
themselves, they may apportion such liability, but a
third state may seek full recovery from either of
them. (A "launching State" means a state that
launches or procur es the launch of a space object, as
well as a state from whose territory or facility a
space object is launched.) A party that suffers dam-
age or whose natural or juridical persons suffer dam-
age may bring a claim through diplomatic channels.
The standard of compensation is to be in accordance
with international law and principles of justice and
equity, in order to restore the injured party to its
pre-damage condition. In the absence of a diplomatic
settlement, the Convention provides for the estab-
lishment of a Claims Commission at the request of
either party. The Commission's award is only bind-
ing if the parties so agree; otherwise, it is a rec-
ommendatory award that the parties are to consider
in good faith.
Although the Liability Convention provides a le-
gal mechanism for establishing liability and damages,
there would likely be problems of proof associated
with a claim based on damage caused by space
debris. In the likely event that damage to or destruc-
tion of a space object was caused by a small, unob-
servable fragment, it would be difficult to establish
the identity of the launching state and therefore to
invoke the Liability Convention.
The Convention on Registration of Objects Laun-
ched into Outer Space, which entered into force on
September 15, 1976, requires the registration with
the United Nations of any space object launched into
earth orbit or beyond. If there are two or more
launching states, those states must determine which
of them will register the space object. In the event
that a piece of space debris caused damage, this
registration system might assist the state suffering
damage in identifying the launching state (or at least
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one of two or more joint launching states) associated
with such debris. If the damaged state were unable
to identify the debris which caused the damage
through the UN registration system, other parties (in
particular those possessing space monitoring and
tracking facilities) would be called upon under the
Convention to respond to the greatest extent feasible
to a request from that state for assistance in the
identification of the debris.
The Agreement on the Rescue on Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, which entered into force
on December 3, 1968, also contains provision poten-
tially relevant to space debris. Under- this Agree-
ment, a party discovering that a space object or
component part thereof has returned to Earth in its
territory is obligated to notify both the launching
state and the United Nations. If the discovering party
has reason to believe that the object or part is of a
"hazardous or deleterious nature", that party may
notify the launching state, which is to take imme-
diate, effective steps (under the direction and control
of the discovery party) to eliminate possible danger
of harm.
In terms of radioactive space debris, there appear
to be three relevant international agreements. The
Limited Test Ban Treaty, which entered into force
on October 10, 1963, obligates parties to prohibit,
prevent, and not carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any
place under its jurisdiction or control in, inter alia,
outer space and the atmosphere. The Treaty was
intended to prevent the wide-ranging distribution of
radioactive debris.
The Convention on Early Notification of a Nu-
clear Accident, which the United States is expected
to soon ratify, requires parties to notify potentially
affected states in case of an accident involving nu-
clear reactors in space, or the use of radioisotopes
for power generation in space objects, from which a
release of radioactive material occurs or is likely to
occur and which has resulted or may result in an
international transboundary release that could be of
radiological safety significance for another state.
The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, to
which the United States will also shortly adhere,
establishes a framework under which a party may
provide assistance to another party in the event of a
nuclear accident or radiological emergency, which
could include the presence of radioactive space de-
bris.
The destruction or removal (retrieval or deorbit)
of non-U.S. debris from outer space would raise a
number of issues under international law. As men-
tioned above, under Article VIII of the Outer Space
Treaty, the State of registry retains jurisdiction and
control over a space object while it is in outer space,
and ownership of objects and their component parts
is not affected by their presence in space. Ownership
would also not be affected by the loss of function of
the space object. If the launching State consented to
the destruction or removal of its space debris, or if it
abandoned its rights to the debris through a clear
expression of intent, destruction or removal could be
considered lawful. However, under customary inter-
national law, State property remains State property
unless expressly relinquished. (Under maritime law,
for example, the United States has consistently main-
tained that sunken State ships remain the property
of the flag State until title is expressly transferred or
abandoned, and that abandonment cannot be implied
from the absence, even over a long period of time,
of acts evidencing an interest in such property.)
In order to take destruction or removal measures
in the absence of consent or abandonment by the
launching State, it would appear that an argument
would have to be made that the jurisdiction and
ownership rights of the launching State must be
balanced against Article IX of the Outer Space Trea-
ty, which, as noted above, requires States to conduct
their space activities with due regard to the cor-
responding interests of other parties. Although a
launching state is not legally required to remove its
objects from space (i.e., the presence of space debris
is not prohibited), if debris were adversely affecting
the activities of other space users, an argument could
be made that a State may lawfully take appropriate
measures to protect itself from harm. See Appendix
2 regarding private sector interest in legalizing sal-
vage operations.
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INTRODUCTION
In order to understand how government regula-
tion will play a role in the commercial space sector's
debris reduction effort, it is necessary to understand
the Federal regulatory approach to the commercial
sector as well as the different types of regulation.
Following an overview of regulatory authority, this
chapter will outline a basic approach for integrating
commercial regulation with other debris mitigation
efforts.
I. REGULATORY OVERVIEW
The Regulatory Program of the U.S. Govern-
ment" identifies three principal functions of Federal
regulations: (a) the direct control of commerce and
trade, i.e. traditional "economic" regulation; (b) the
protection of public health and safety and the envi-
ronment; and (c) the proper management and con-
trol of Federal funds and Federal property. The
functions and authority of the three principal Fed-
eral agencies involved in the regulation of commer-
cial space activities--i.e. the Department of
Transportation (DOT), the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) and the Department of Com-
merce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration (NOAA)--fall into all three categories of
regulatory functions. The authority of both the FCC
and NOAA concerns the first category: the regula-
tion of business activities principall y for economic
reasons. In contrast, DOT and the FCC are charged
by statute with carrying out the second category of
functions: DOT regulates the commercial launch sec-
tor to protect public health and safety, as well as
other public interests, and the FCC regulates com-
munications by wire and radio for the purpose of
promoting safety of life and property. The FCC's
authority also falls into the third category in that it
manages and controls the private sector's use of a
federal property (the national radio frequency spec-
trum).
The Communications Act of 1934 confers on the
FCC the authority to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce in communications by wire and radio.
The FCC's authority includes the responsibility for
allocating a finite number of available radio fre-
quencies and managing their use. The FCC's role in
regulating commercial space activities derives from
this authority and involves licensing providers of
telecommunications services (which may include sat-
ellites), assignment of orbital positions consistent
with international treaties and establishment of stan-
dards governing transmitter design and operation to
ensure appropriate frequency usage (such as
spacecraft control pointing accuracy and position tol-
erance). To carry out these responsibilities, the FCC
authorizes the construction, launch and operation of
U.S. commercial communication satellites in order to
maintain the communications capability of the radio
frequency spectrum and geo-stationary satellite orbit,
while at the same time recognizing DOT's respon-
sibility for safety issues associated with payload
launch and mission.
NOAA's authority with respect to commercial
space activities is granted under Title IV of the Land
Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984.
NOAA is responsible for licensing private remote-
sensing space systems for the purpose of providing a
framework for the phased commercialization of land
remote sensing while maintaining U.S. leadership in
civil remote sensing, assuring continuous data avail-
ability to the Federal Government and fulfilling U.S.
international defense and security commitments. Li-
censes may be issued for systems utilizing a civilian
U.S. Government satellite or vehicle as a platform
for the system, as well as privately-owned satellites.
Section 402(b)(3) of Title IV requires all licenses to
include a condition under which the licensee must
"upon termination of operations under the license,
make disposition of any satellites in space in a man-
ner satisfactory to the President." This clearly pro-
vides adequate authority to require that a spent
spacecraft not be left in a position that contributes
to the space debris problerrl. Presumably, any rea-
sonable combination of design and orbital conditions
could be imposed to promote the desired disposition.
By implication, authority to control the disposition
of the entire spacecraft would include authority to
impose reasonable conditions directed at maintaining
a spacecraft intact during operations (i.e., in orbit)
or at controlling the disposition of any pieces shed
during operations. NOAA's authority under Title IV
does not extend to activities that are part of the
launch.
W Regulatory Program of the U.S. Government, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, April 1. 1985 -March
31, 1986, at page xiv.
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The principal purpose of the authority granted to
the Secretary of Transportation under the Commer-
cial Space Launch Act of 1984 is to oversee and
coordinate the conduct of commercial space launch
operations in a manner that protects the important
national interests associated with such activities: pub-
lic health and safety, safety of property and U.S.
national security and foreign policy interests. The
Secretary is empowered to issue licenses authorizing
the conduct of commercial launch activities and to
establish the regulatory regime for ensuring that they
are conducted safely and responsibly. III course
of devising appropriate regulatory guidance the Sec-
retary may, by regulation, eliminate any existing
Federal requirements otherwise applicable to com-
mercial launch activities that is determined to be
unnecessary to protect the national interests. The
Secretar} may also add new requirements to safe-
guard those interests or to ensure compliance with
U.S. international obligations. DOT's charter as a
safety regulatory agency encompasses all non-govern-
ment launches conducted by U.S. citizens or from
U.S. territory; payloads involved in launches subject
to DOT licensing requirements; and non-U.S. Gov-
ernment launch sites (e.g. privately-operated or
state-run spaceports). With specific regard to non-
government payloads on non-governmental launch
vehicles, proposals to launch payloads that are not
subject to licensing by another U.S. Government
agency must be regulated by DOT from the stand-
point of the national interests the Department is
charged with protecting. If a proposal runs counter
to those interests, DOT can prohibit the launch of
the payload in question.
DOT's authority over satellites is very broad ex-
cept with respect to two specific areas: (a) the licens-
ing and regulation of telecom III mications satellites
by the FCC under the Communications Act of 1934;
and (b) the licensing of remote-sensing space systems
by NOAA under the Land Remote-Sensing Commer-
cialization Act of 1984. To the extent that a payload
requires a license under either of these regimes in
order to be launched, DOT may not duplicate the
review process of either of those agencies or reconsi-
der the merits of the specific service to be provided
pursuant to the license. Although a separate licens-
ing procedure exists for these two types of satellites,
DOT's authority to ensure the safety of commercial
launch and payload operations--including the safety
of the pre-launch, launch and in-space transportation
phases of these operations--is nevertheless unaffect-
ed.
The uncontrolled proliferation of orbital debris
poses a threat to public safet y , the safety of property
and U.S. commitments on international liability is-
sues. Federal regulation of the commercial space
launch sector for the purpose of preventing and
contr olling orbital debris, therefore, falls into the
"safety" category of regulatory functions. As noted
above, DOT is expressly authorized to regulate com-
mercial launch activities in terms of public safety
and other public interests, and the FCC is expressly
authorized to regulate the use of radio to promote
the safety of life and property. In addition, the
relationship among the regulatory agencies for space
purposes can follow the existing alignment for ter-
restr ial activities. For example, whereas the FCC
regulates mobile land, marine or airborne radio com-
munications systems and service, DOT regulates the
vehicle (e.g. truck, ship or aircraft) by which the
service is provided. In addition, similar to the way in
which the FCC regulates the painting of radio towers
consistent with FAA air navigation requirements, the
FCC's regulations may include physical movement of
spacecraft to promote safety of life and property
according to DOT standards. As to space-related
activities, therefore, the economic .focus of NOAA
and the regulatory focus of the FCC on the provi-
sion of telecommunication services would continue
to be distinguished from DOT's focus on the safety
and transportation components of the launch ve-
hicles and spacecraft.
II. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
APPROACH
By virtue of its statutory authority and respon-
sibilities, DOT has assumed a comprehensive
approach to on-orbit safety and space debris issues.
Implementation of this approach includes on-going
regulatory action and current research programs, as
well as plans for additional activity to address the
orbital debris problem, in the following areas: (a)
licensing and enforcement; (b) safety and regulatory
research and standards development; and(c) financial
responsibility/insurance requirements and risk alloca-
tion regimes.
A. Licensing and Enforcement
DOT is already working with the commercial
launch companies, through the licensing process, to
address the orbital debris issues raised by proposed
commercial launch activities.
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The launch license application review process
consists of two components, a Safety Review and a
Mission Review, which address orbital safety and, by
implication, debris control and prevention in the
following manner.
• Review of ELV staging and maneuvering
hardware reliability and safety, including stat-
istics on previous failures, the failure mode
and effect analysis (FMEA) and consequences
of such failures;
• Review of mission planning and design, in-
cluding the proposed orbital trajectory, the
orbital insertion and separation maneuvers
and estimated orbital life for proposed geo-
transfer and parking orbits;
• Review of the license application to ensue
that the operational plans preserve safe prac-
tices developed and used by various agencies
of the U.S. Government, such as venting of
propellants and pressu-ants in spent stages
left on-orbit to preclude explosions, separa-
tion maneuvers to avoid collisions and any
satellite position management and disposal at
end of life, if applicable to prevent collisions
in high orbits and the possible generation of
long-lived debris.
B. Regulatory and Safety Research and
Standards Development
Under Executive Orders 12291 and 12498, pro-
posed Government safety regulations and standards
must be subjected to a rigorous test of need, cost vs.
benefit and impact. No DOT commercial space safe-
ty regulatory action is initiated, therefore, without
extensive research and analysis.
DOT has an active research program underway
to address a wide range of safety issues involving
commercial ranges, launch services and orbital op-
eration, and to improve on methods of evaluating
reentry safety for both normal and accidental, as
well as natural and possibly controlled, reentry of
space objects. Planned research will examine the rel-
ative effectiveness and cost/benefit of various pro-
posed debris generation and control options that
involve either vehicle design (e.g. litter-free systems)
and operational practices (e.g. retro-firing maneuvers
at apogee to speed up reentry of spent stages left in
orbit).
The products of DOT's safety research will be
used to identify the regulatory options and standards
that will guide future industry practices. Congress
has approved funding for DOT's FY 1989 plans to
begin developing standards that can be applied to
commercial operations in space.
C. Financial Responsibility and
Insurance Requirements
DOT has the authority to require that safety
measures be implemented by means of insurance
requirements or other evidence of financial respon-
sibility. Whereas the purpose of safety standards is to
reduce the incidence of accidents, insurance is a
mechanism designed to compensate for the conse-
quences of accidents and to protect against the
"cost" hazards of orbital debris. DOT expects to
issue a rule in the near future which addresses finan-
cial responsibility and allocation of risk, and estab-
lishes the basic mechanisms whereby companies may
be required to carry insurance. In the meantime,
such requirements continue to be imposed on a
case-by-case basis pending issuance of the rule.
III. REGULATORY RESTRAINT
The National Space Policy expresses a sensitivity
to the potential impacts of orbital debris measures
on the commercial sector, stating that such measures
must be "consistent with mission requirements and
cost effectiveness," and must not unnecessarily preju-
dice the development and international competitive-
ness of the U.S. commercial space industry. These
same principles are, however, even more forcefully
articulated in other Federal regulatory policy state-
ments imposing more stringent standards on regula-
tory authorities to exercise restraint in their
activities.
Most of the proposed debris reduction solutions
add to the cost of the launch process or payload
operation. A requirement to deorbit upper stages,
for instance, entails weight and performance changes
that increase launch costs. In determining what steps
the U.S. Government should take to address the
orbital debris problem, therefore, it is necessary to
consider the economic impact of commercial regula-
tions on the domestic launch industry. Unlike the
two governmental sectors (civilian and defense), the
private, non-governmental sector functions in a high-
ly competitive environment. The cost of orbital de-
bris measures are passed on to the customer. If the
same launch requirements are not imposed on for-
eign competitors in the launch industry, the U.S.
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launch firms may have to operate at a distinct com-
petitive disadvantage. Similarly, added costs can have
a direct hearing on the competitiveness of space-
based technologies (such as satellite communications)
as compared to terrestrial alternatives (such as fiber
optics communications).
A robust and economically viable commercial
launch sector is a necessary component of the Na-
tional Space Policy strategy to assure the continu-
ance of U.S. leadership in space. Consistent with this
objective, DOT'S mission under the Act is to pro-
mote and encourage a commercial launch industry.
While the Act authorizes regulation of the industry
as well, DOT'S regulatory authority is limited to the
extent necessary to ensure compliance with U.S. in-
ternational obligations and to protect the public
health and safety, safety of property and U.S. na-
tional security and foreign policy interests. This ap-
proach reflects the underlying principles of Federal
regulatory policy generally, which provide that regu-
latory action may not be undertaken unless benefits
to society outweigh the costs.
Consistent with Federal regulatory policy as well
as DOT's statutory mandate, therefore, the imposi-
tion of a requirement on the commercial launch
sector to control or prevent the proliferation of
space debris will take into consideration these addi-
tional factors.
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The success of space endeavors depends upon a
space environment sufficiently free of debris to en-
able the safe and dependable operation of spacecraft.
An environment overly cluttered with debris would
threaten the ability to utilize space for a wide variety
of scientific, technological, military and commercial
purposes.
In recognition of this potential problem, the Ad-
ministration's National Space Policy states that:
"...all space sectors will seek to minimize the
creation of space debris. Design and oper-
ations of space tests, experiments and systems
will strive to minimize or reduce accumula-
tion of space debris consistent with mission
requirements and cost effectiveness."
This section outlines the essential findings of the
interagency study on the orbital debris problem and
recommends actions to be taken in response to these
findings.
I. FINDINGS
A. Limitations on debris measurements and the
consequent limitations in debris environment model-
ing create uncertainty as to the urgency for action
and the effectiveness of any particular mitigation
measure. The need for enhanced measurement capa-
bility has been universally recognized.
B. Left unchecked, the growth of debris could
substantially threaten the safe and reliable operation
of manned and unmanned spacecraft in the next
century.
C. Two different critical areas have been iden-
tified for the near term: the low earth orbit environ-
ment requires urgent attention because of the high
relative velocities among objects in orbit and the
large masses in LEO, while the geosynchronous arc
requires attention because so many additional
spacecraft will approach the end of their maneuver
capability within the next few years.
D. Several promising R&D efforts are already
underway in various agencies. However, the scope
and pace of current R&D plans and activities may
not be sufficient to offer future program managers
an adequate array of cost-effective technologies and
procedures for debris minimization and spacecraft
survivability. Insufficient coordination currently
takes place between federal agencies pursuing these
projects, as well as between government and the
private sector.
E. Responsibility for addressing the orbital de-
bris problem cuts across agency boundaries. Cur-
rently, there is no single interagency focus for
establishing direction, coordinating efforts and over-
seeing implementation of debris mitigation policies.
F. For various reasons, agencies with operational
and regulatory responsibilities for spacecraft have
not as yet decided to promulgate policies pertaining
to mitigation of orbital debris.
G. The orbital debris problem has both gov-
ernmental and commercial dimensions.
H. The causes and consequences of orbital de-
bris are global in scope. The scope will continue to
widen as more nations become "users" of space or
develop their own space programs. While individual
nations can take positive steps to alleviate the prob-
lem, international cooperation is essential to a sat-
isfactory solution, and some multilateral discussions
have already taken place.
I. No comprehensive U.S. Government strategy
exists for addressing the debris problem over the
long term due to uncertainty about the debris popu-
lation, the differences in the space systems operated
or regulated by the various agencies and the con-
sequent variations in susceptibility to the debris haz-
ard. The need for additional policy and a strategy is
recognized.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Minimizing orbital debris should be a design
consideration for all future commercial, civil and
military launch vehicles, upper stages, satellites,
space tests and missions.
B. Each agency with operational or regulatory
responsibilities for spacecraft should develop and dis-
tribute internal policy guidance consistent with Na-
tional Space Policy regarding debris minimization.
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C. Current agency operational practices for
debris mitigation dur ing launch and space operations
should be continued and, where feasible and cost-
effective, improved.
D. The following activities should be empha-
sized and, where appropriate, accelerated:
• efforts to improve debris characterization
measurements and inventory through use of
ground-based radars and development of a
hybrid data base that will provide for rapid
information retrieval and database growth
• modeling and statistical anal yses of the debris
characterization measurements
• analysis of physical evidence returned from
space
• technological research directed toward im-
proved shielding and a better understanding
of the collision/fragmentation processes
• licensing agency development of performance
requirements and regulations to guide private
industry activities
• on-going studies of design and operations
techniques to minimize the cost of debris
elimination.
E. NASA and DoD should undertake a joint
study to develop a comprehensive R&D plan to
improve the performance of monitoring, modeling
and data management capabilities. The plan should
define the desired level of confidence in debris char-
acterization data for all of LEO for particles 0.1 cm
to 10 cm diameter and the desired deadline for
achieving this confidence level. The objective is to
achieve the highest feasible level of confidence, tak-
ing into account mission requirements and cost-ef-
fectiveness. This plan should be provided to agency
management for use in preparing agency budget
submissions within the overall resources and policy
guidance provided by the President. The NASA-DoD
team should brief the appropriate interagency group
on this plan no later than January 1, 1990. This
briefing would include a description of the tasks to
be accomplished, the priority of each task, necessary
funding and an incremental milestone schedule. This
briefing would further recommend specific agen-
cies/organizations to be assigned missions for the
accomplishment of each designated task.
F. NASA and DoD, in consultation with DOT
and the private sector, should undertake a joint
study to develop a basic research plan for developing
generic technologies and procedures for debris mini-
mization and spacecraft survivability. The plan
should build on current research efforts and should
indicate a logical research sequence that can be tai-
lored, as necessary, to accommodate various resource
levels. This plan should be provided to agency man-
agement for use in preparing agency budget submis-
sions within the overall resources and policy
guidance provided by the President. A NASA-DoD
team should brief the interagency group on this plan
not later than January 1, 1990. The briefing will
include a description of tasks to be accomplished,
the priority of each task, funding availability and
needs and projected task completion dates. This
briefing would further recommend specific agen-
cies/organizations to be assigned missions for the
accomplishment of each designated task.
G. An interagency team should study and, as
appropriate, develop a plan for minimizing accu-
mulation of debris in geosynchronous orbits. The
study should include an examination of the feasibil-
ity of spacecraft disposal options. Consultations with
interested private sector parties will be an integral
part of this process. The team should brief the
interagency group on this plan not later than Janu-
ary 1, 1990.
H. Because the orbital debris problem has im-
portant commercial dimensions, solutions will
require a continuing dialog between the federal gov-
ernment and the private sector.
I. Representatives of commercial licensing agen-
cies (DOT, DOC and FCC) should continue their
discussions to define the boundaries of regulatory
authority among the licensing agencies over commer-
cial activities that may produce orbital debris.
J. An ad-hoc interagency working group on
orbital debris, chaired by NASA and DoD, should be
retained as a coordinating mechanism for issues,
policies and activities concerning the orbital debris
problem. The working group should report to
SIG(Space) or its successor and should make rec-
ommendations as appropriate.
K. The U.S. should inform other space-faring
nations about the conclusions of this report and seek
to evaluate the level of understanding and concern
of other nations and relevant international organiza-
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tions about orbital debris issues. Where appropriate,
the U.S. should enter into discussions with other
nations to coordinate debris minimization policies
and practices.
L. Within eighteen months from approval of this
report, an interagency working group should coordi-
nate development of a long-term strategy for re-
searching, developing and implementing means to
minimize the accumulation of orbital debris and pro-
tect spacecraft operations (within an acceptable level
of risk) from collision with debris objects. As a
minimum, this strategy should include establishing
long range goals, providing a milestone plan and
schedule leading to achievement of these long-term
goals, and the associated preliminary resource im-
plications.
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PRIVATE SECTOR INPUT
I. Request for Private Sector Input:
In August 1988 an announcement was placed in the Commerce Business Daily requesting private
sector input and comments about orbital debris issues.
II. Response :
The companies and organizations which responded are listed below, in alphabetical order:
Applied Research Corporation
Astro Innovations, Inc.
Committee To Bridge The Gap
EOSat
General Research Corporation
Grumman Space Systems
Kaman Sciences Corporation
KMS Fusion Corporation
Teledyne Brown Engineering
I11. Summary of Responses:
Applied Research Corporation
Proposes a simple, relatively low cost space experiment to obtain real debris data over a two to three
year period. These data, together with a good analytical model could accurately predict and then be used for
space damage assessment.
Astro Innovations Inc.
Advocates change to international laws that would allow and encourage active salvage operations at
geosynchronous and GTO altitudes. The sovereign rights of space)faring nations could be maintained, while
affording commercially attractive salvage opportunities to those so able.
Committee To Bridge The Gap
Proposes a ban on the use of nuclear power supplies in Earth orbit.
General Research Corporation
Describes two Orbital Debris Mitigation Systems conceptually designed to be used in a variety of
configurations to solve a number of debris-related problems. The first system is a maneuverable free-flying
spacecraft, and the second is a shielding unit, or units, attached to the space system being protected. General
comments about potential applications, benefits, and developmental costs are provided.
Grumman Space Systems
Proposes the use of their Tumbling Satellite Retrieval Kit to capture large pieces of orbital debris.
A-2-1
Daman Sciences Corporation
Proposes a laser device that could be used to slow and deorbit a variety of orbital debris. Existing
devices, experiments, and analyses (esp. DoD) will permit rapid validation of this concept.
KMS Fusion Corporation
Stated interest in attending Orbital Debris discussions. They saw their involvement in the Cosmic Dust
Collection Facility and a proposed Debris Collision Warning System as potentially useful.
EOSat
As operator of Landsat, EOSAT supports government action and international cooperation to deal
with the growing problem oforbital debris.
Copies of the full reports mentioned in the responses were reviewed by members of the IG (Space) Orbital
Debris Working Group and are available at NASA Headquarters.
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